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Full Legal Representation for the Poor:
The Clash Between Lawyer Values
and Client Worthiness
MICHELLE S. JACOBS*
I. INTRODUCTION
A cornerstone of our legal system is the right of all clients, includ-
ing poor ones, to full and zealous representation. This belief is re-
flected in our professional public pronouncements and is incorporated
in our doctrinal law.' Similar exhortations are included in the rules
and guidelines for Legal Services lawyers and public defenders.2 De-
spite these public pronouncements and the supporting law, the han-
dling of legal matters on behalf of the poor regularly falls short of
what would constitute acceptable advocacy on behalf of clients who
can afford to pay for counsel.
In prior writings, I have asked whether lawyers expect the stan-
dard of zealous representation to apply to their representation of the
poor.3 I have also explored the ongoing resistance among lawyers to
* Professor of Law, University of Florida, Frederic G. Levin College of Law; J.D.,
Rutgers University School of Law - Newark; A.B., Princeton University. I am indebted to Dr.
Lisa Brown for her help and guidance on this project and for the assistance of her graduate and
undergraduate assistants. My thanks also to Professors Mary Zulack, Conrad Johnson, Eliza-
beth McCulloch, Caroline Kearney, and the faculty members from the Howard University Law
School Colloquium series. This article was supported by the University of Florida Law Center
Foundation Summer Research Grant Program. And finally, my thanks to my research assistants,
Yolonda Jones and Shondriette Kelley.
1. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent defendant entitled to
counsel in criminal trial to ensure constitutional right to a fair trial).
2. See, e.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JusTICE: THE DEFENSE
FUNcrioN STANDARD § 4-1.2(h) ("Once representation has been undertaken, the functions and
duties of defense counsel are the same whether defense counsel is assigned, privately retained,
or serving in a Legal Aid or defender program.").
3. See Michelle S. Jacobs, Legal Rules of Professionalism: Do Ethical Rules Require Zeal-
ous Representation for Poor People?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 97 (1995) [hereinafter Jacobs, Legal]
(arguing that despite encouragement to provide zealous representation, practice actually dis-
courages it).
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perform pro bono services.4 The persistent acceptance of two stan-
dards of justice, one for those who can pay and another for the poor,
demands a more systematic probing of the reasons why the disparate
conditions are allowed to continue. The disparities are widely
known.' Yet efforts to resolve them are not universally supported or
generously funded. Possibly, the equalization of quality representa-
tion remains stalled because lawyers do not really value the poor and
therefore do not see them as being entitled to the same quality of
representation as the wealthy.
As a practicing lawyer assigned to indigent clients, I was some-
times disturbed by comments made by my colleagues about the clients
to whom they were assigned.6 Their voices would often be tinged with
disrespect and, frankly, disgust towards their clients.7 Although these
observations made me uncomfortable at the time, I saw them as their
clients' problem more than my own. However, during my tenure as a
clinical professor I have also heard many students express similar atti-
tudes toward their clients. I find the phenomenon deeply disturbing.
Most of the students are "traditional" law students. They come
to law school straight from college, with little work experience and
very limited life experience, yet they feel free to cast judgment on
people whose lives are more complicated than they can imagine.
Worse, these students will become the legal community of the next
4. See Michelle S. Jacobs, Pro Bono Work and Access to Justice for the Poor: Real Change
or Imagined Change, 48 FLA. L. REV. 509 (1997) [hereinafter Jacobs, Pro Bono].
5. Many states have, for example, performed studies to determine the level of unmet legal
need among the poor. See Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services - Final Re-
port to the Chief Judge of the State of New York, 19 HoFsTRA L. REv. 755 (1991) [hereinafter
Marrero Report]; see also Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial
System, 16 HAMLINE L. REV. 477 (1993) (examining the unmet needs of Minnesota's poor, par-
ticularly the needs of its citizens of color); James W. Meeker & John Dombrink, 2020 Vision: A
Plan for the Future of California's Courts, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2217 (1993) (examining access to
the legal system for low-income and moderate-income Californians); Wendy F. Rau, The Unmet
Legal Needs of the Poor in Maine: Is Mandatory Pro Bono the Answer? 43 ME. L. REV. 235
(1991) (examining the unmet needs of Maine's poor); Omar J. Arcia, Objections, Administrative
Difficulties and Alternatives to Mandatory Pro Bono Legal Services in Florida, 22 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 771 (1995) (examining Florida's voluntary pro bono program).
6. Not all assigned lawyers react in this way. t had the pleasure of working with many fine
lawyers in New York City and that experience remains one of the best that I had as a practicing
lawyer. Nonetheless, I remember many an off hand comment made by some lawyers about their
clients, including one where the lawyer had apparently gotten so comfortable in my presence
that he referred to his client as "that nigger ... ," a comment which elicited a sharp response
from me.
7. It is also important to note that I never heard any of the Federal Public Defenders in the
Southern District of New York speak of their clients in this way. I have, on the other hand,
overheard many state public defenders and Legal Aid or Legal Services lawyers speak disparag-
ingly and condescendingly of and to their clients.
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generation. Through personal conversations, review of student jour-
nal entries and class discussions, I learned that many of the students
believed their clients should be grateful for the students' willingness to
take on their cases.8 On many levels, the students believed that the
clients were not even worthy of having the students represent them.9
The belief that poor clients must demonstrate worthiness before
they become entitled to the same benefits the non-poor enjoy is not
exclusive to lawyers and law students, but rather reflects a view found
in society as a whole."a In order for lawyers to begin providing first-
class service to indigent clients, we must first identify the beliefs and
values that prevent us from seeing the indigent as worthy of full
representation.
What values are lawyers and students supposed to have? The
American Bar Association commissioned a task force to conduct a
study on legal values, now called the "MacCrate Report."" t The task
force studied professional development in the legal community, and
concluded that all lawyers should possess the following skills and
values:
8. The concept that the client should be grateful is fascinating, particularly when you con-
trast it with the reason why many students take clinic. The primary reason for enrollment is to
gain trial skills. Assistance to the poor is a secondary and sometimes a distant tertiary goal.
Comparable motivation is given as the reason why law graduates choose to take jobs in the
public defender office. See LISA MCINTYRE, THE PUBLIC DEFENDERS: THE PRACTICE OF LAW
IN THE SHADOWS OF REPUTE (1987). Since the students are not undertaking the work as a result
of some magnanimous feelings toward the clients, one wonders why the clients are expected to
be grateful.
9. In the fall of 1996, I visited at Columbia University and co-taught in their Fair Housing
Clinic. As one of the role modeling exercises early in the semester, the students were led to
believe that one of their clients would be coming by the clinic to be interviewed during class
time. At the appointed time, the client did not appear and the class waited. The exercise was
structured so that the faculty could engage the students in a discussion about their feelings to-
ward the client and his failure to appear. While we were in class, the students got a phone call
from the client. As part of the exercise, they attempted to find out why he did not show up or
rearrange the appointment. As it unfolded, the students learned that the client had called earlier
to cancel but the message was never forwarded to them. The client's daughter had become ill
and he needed to stay at home to take care of her. In addition, the client said the time of the
interview was generally inconvenient for him. After several students attempted to resolve the
dilemma, the interview was rescheduled. The class discussed the event. My co-teacher, Mary
Zulack, and I were both surprised at the intense student reaction against the client. Two or three
students wanted to terminate him from the clinic program. Despite the fact that he attempted to
get a message to them and canceled for a compelling reason, some characterized his failure to
attend as "irresponsible," and wondered whether we should continue to waste further clinic re-
sources on him. Because this was an initial interview, I was puzzled by the students' opinion that
the client was not worthy of their time and attention.
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION, AMERICAN BAR AssoCIA-
TION, "LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: AN EDUCATIONAL CONTIN-
uUM" (Robert MacCrate ed., 1992) [hereinafter MacCrate, TASK FORCE].
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Provision of competent representation;
Striving to promote justice, fairness and morality;
Striving to improve the profession; and
Professional self-development. 2
As part of the commentary expanding the meaning of "striving to
improve the profession" of law, students were to be encouraged to
help ensure that adequate legal services are provided to those who
cannot pay.13 Included within the concept of "striving to promote jus-
tice" was the exhortation to treat other people (including clients,
other attorneys and support personnel) with dignity and respect. 4
The commentary, however, does not engage in a discussion of whether
it is important to value the client herself, as opposed to just being
courteous to her.
Lawyers and scholars have continued to build upon the work of
the MacCrate Report's discussion of skills and values.'5 Recommen-
dations have been made to encourage teaching law students that pub-
lic service is a central tenet of lawyering. I6 Other recommendations
include providing opportunities for law students to express concerns
about conflicts between ethical requirements and personal values in
forums where they can be fully discussed."
Discussion of lawyer values in scholarly literature is increasing,
but the term itself is rarely scrutinized. Apparently, our profession
assumes a common understanding of what "value" means.'i We may
assume that there is agreement on the basic values, which all lawyers
should believe are important to lawyering. If so, these assumptions
are subject to challenge. The common definition of "value" is a "prin-
ciple, standard or quality regarded as worthwhile or desirable."19 An-
12. Id. at 140-41.
13. See id. at 140.
14. See id. at 213-14 (stating that clients are not set out separately in the commentary, but
rather included with others holding a different relationship to the lawyer. Though the authors of
the report speak of this as a value, they are really speaking of courtesy); see also id. at 214
(noting that the commentary also includes a prohibition against harassing clients or discriminat-
ing against them on the basis of race, gender, age, etc.).
15. See, e.g., The MacCrate Report: Building the Educational Continuum, Conference Pro-
ceedings (1993).
16. See PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL
EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM 22
(1996).
17. See id.
18. See MacCrate, TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at 140 (recognizing the difficulty of defining
values and separating them from skills).
19. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH USAGE (1989).
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other meaning of "value" is "to regard highly" or "to hold in
esteem., 2 0 The use of the word "value" in the MacCrate Report and
other literature emphasizes the first definition - that lawyers regard
service to the poor as a worthwhile or desirable end. Thus, it is consis-
tent with public pronouncements spoken of above, for law schools and
law students to be encouraged to reflect that "value."
While it is laudable to call for adoption of the four skills and val-
ues enumerated in the MacCrate Report, focusing exclusively on the
four skills leads to an unnecessarily narrow scope of values which law
students and lawyers should be encouraged to reflect. The balance of
this article seeks to expand the scope of our understanding of values
and their connection to the work of poverty lawyers.
In Part II.A of this article, I explore the literature on poverty and
moral worthiness. One prevalent theme throughout the literature is
the belief that poor people are not morally worthy. Their poverty is
viewed as the manifestation of a moral defect. Further, some com-
mentators reflect a belief that the poor do not possess the same values
as the non-poor. However, I have not seen how such commentators
define "values," nor have I seen any studies substantiating the notion
that the poor are morally defective. In order to bring clarity to the
discussion, I examine social science research on values in Part II.B,
defining "values" and detailing how they can affect behavior.
In Part III.A, I describe the reactions of some of my clinical stu-
dents to a classroom exercise, which asked them to describe the legal
representation they would provide to hypothetical clients. The clients
differed in race and class. Their responses to the exercise suggested
that some students would give different service to a poor client versus
a client whose parent had financial means. I began to question
whether there were general societal views about poverty and moral
worthiness, and if so, to what extent would students and lawyers be
influenced by these views.
Part III.B describes my first attempts to experiment with the col-
lection of statistical data. With the help of a psychologist, a pilot study
was constructed to study two issues: (1) whether law students engage
in value ranking; and (2) whether a correlation could be shown be-
tween value rankings and a student's perception of zealous represen-
tation of the poor. The preliminary results indicate that, as to the first
issue, law students do engage in value ranking. Study results also sug-
20. Id.
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gest interesting differences between the value rankings of students of
color and white students at the University of Florida Law School. The
law students' value rankings were contrasted with a national sample to
assess whether they were similar to those of people sympathetic to the
poor, anti-poor, or in between. The preliminary data indicates that
some students endorse value rankings, which Rokeach has linked with
anti-poor attitudes. As to the second issue, it became clear that the
survey instrument needed more development before conclusions
could be drawn about students and "zealous advocacy" for a poor
client.
If law students' beliefs may affect their relationships with clients,
there may also be a link between broader societal beliefs and practices
of the bar itself. Part IV describes how the link between students'
values and broader societal beliefs affect the practices of the bar. Stu-
dents' descriptions of the poor as undeserving clientele parallel the
experience of poverty practice. Concepts of client worthiness may sig-
nificantly affect the bar's response to the needs of poor people. Part
IV also explains the history of the bar's relationship with poor people
and concludes that the bar reflects the dominant societal view that
poor people are unworthy. The institutional view that the poor are
unworthy significantly affects the morale of lawyers whose work is pri-
marily or exclusively in the poverty area.
In Part V, I discuss the proposition that the legal community will
continue to see the poor as unworthy of full legal representation until
society can envision the poor as part of our moral community. Finally,
I offer suggestions for fuller studies into whether poverty itself en-
courages lawyers to temper the quality of representation given to the
poor.
II. HOW SOCIETY VALUES THE POOR
A. Poverty and Moral Worthiness
Attitudes toward the poor and of poverty have been dominated
for centuries by three main issues: (1) the categorization of the poor,
(2) the impact of poor relief on work motivation, labor supply and
family life, and (3) the limits of social obligation. 21 Early in the nine-
teenth century, public officials attempted to distinguish the able-bod-
[VOL. 44:257
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ied poor from the impotent poor." A few decades later, the
categories had transmuted into distinctions between the worthy and
the unworthy, or the deserving and the undeserving poor.23 When
considering the labels used to describe the poor, the hostility to them
is apparent and their assumed deviance is built into the words them-
selves.2 4 Most labels for the poor have been specific, although the
people to which they are given are sometimes thought so dangerous or
flawed that people labeled with one word are accused of having other
faults, until finally the label is broadened into an umbrella encompass-
ing more than one fault.25
It is questionable whether more than a small segment of society
has ever been benevolent toward the poor, particularly when the poor
in question are viewed as being "undeserving" or "unworthy." On the
other hand the worthy poor are treated with compassion and re-
spect.26 Michael Katz believed the difference in treatment between
the worthy and the unworthy poor, in its full spectrum could be seen
in the public's reaction to homelessness. He claimed, initially when
the plight of the homeless became widely known, it evoked a generous
response from the public. Early examination of the homeless problem
22. Id. at 12 (citing Josiah Quincy's report on the poor laws of the Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts in 1821). The "impotent" poor were those wholly incapable of working through old
age, infancy, sickness or disability; the poor were those who were capable of work, although the
degree of their capacity to work might differ. Quincy distinguished the poor from paupers
(those receiving public relief). Although poverty carried no stigma, pauperism did. As the dis-
tinction between poverty and pauperism hardened, commentators increasingly attributed the
latter to moral sources. Id. at 13; see also HERBERT GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR: THE
UNDERCLASS AND ANTI-POVERTY POLICY 14 (1995) (indicating that the beginning of the distinc-
tion between worthy and unworthy may have begun as early as the 14th century, when responsi-
bility for the English poor was given over from centralized church to locally governed parishes).
23. KATZ, supra note 21, at 5; see also JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKELL HASENFELD, THE
MORAL CONSTRucrION OF POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA (1991) (stating that "the
distinction between the 'deserving' poor and the 'undeserving' poor is a moral issue: it affirms
the value of the dominant society by stigmatizing the outcasts." Moreover, the authors trace the
historic connection made between concepts of individual responsibility and work ethic to the
evaluation of the conditions of poverty and ranking of the poor as worthy and unworthy).
24. See KATZ, supra note 21, at 5 (noting that words which reflect societal connotations of
individual defectiveness of the poor are: ne'er-do-wells, feeble minded, morons, culturally de-
prived. Poor who are perceived as dangers to public health are referred to as: ragged and dirty,
are said to live in slums, and use needles and illegal drugs. The mobile poor are labeled as
hobos, vagrants, bums, tramps, shiftless, drifters, loiterers, and more recently, homeless. Finally
there are the poor who are viewed as having fallen out of the class structure; they are referred to
as the residue, dregs, lower-lower class, and the underclass).
25. See GANS, supra note 22, at 16 (noting the interchangeability of defects. Gans uses a
welfare recipient as an example of one who is accused of being economically dependent and
lacking in family "values" (e.g., failing to get married, being sexually promiscuous, raising school
dropouts and delinquent youngsters, and giving birth to another generation of unmarried
mothers who will turn to welfare dependence)),
26. See id.
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reflected an appeal to the "gift relationship."27 Discourse on the
homeless stressed "their almost saint-like spirit," and "docility and
gratitude," rather than anger and suspicion." The approach frus-
trated policy development as it frustrated long term solutions, looking
towards volunteerism to ameliorate homelessness rather than focusing
on policy development against poverty on a broader scale. Neither
were poor people encouraged to take aggressive action on their own
behalf.2 9 Sociologists predicted that if homeless people began to be
viewed as becoming more aggressive, rather than docile and apprecia-
tive, they would sink into the ranks of the undeserving and the public
would be less tolerant of them." This indeed happened as media be-
gan to portray homeless as violent people who threatened public
safety. Media portrayals of drug-addicted men were meant to create
the image of the homeless as threatening.3 Currently, the homeless
are no longer seen as deserving poor.
The concept that there was a group of poor that were "undeserv-
ing" became entrenched in Europe and America in the 1800s. The
distinction between the working poor (respectable) and the pauper
requesting public assistance (morally discredited) spread with indus-
trialization and urbanization.32 Characteristics of racial, genetic, and
psychological inferiority were used to describe the poor who conserva-
tives believed could work but did not.33 Poverty took on meanings
that exceeded a description of economic conditions of a segment of
27. KATZ, supra note 21, at 193 (noting that the historic role of charity extended beyond the
alleviation of poverty; it served to bind classes together to reinforce social relations based on
deference and obligation).
28. Id.
29. See id. at 194.
30. See id. at 192.
31. Compare the treatment of the challenge to vagrancy statutes in Pottinger v. Miami, 810
F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. FL 1991) (stating that homelessness is a status, and therefore, the statute
prohibiting vagrancy is unconstitutional) with Joyce v. United States, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal.
1994) (disagreeing with the proposition that homelessness is a status). See also Homeless Facing
Removal from City, ATrLANTA CONSTITUTION, Sept. 15, 1995.
32. See Jack Katz, Caste, Class, and Counsel for the Poor, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 255
[hereinafter Caste]; see also KATZ, supra note 21, at 15 (indicating that the predispositions to-
ward a moral definition of poverty found support in Protestant theology during the antebellum
period; after the Civil War in the work of Darwin and early hereditarian theory; and in twentieth
century eugenics theory. Marx incorporated the moral definition of poverty into his writing
about the lumpen proletariat, and the concept survived through the Depression despite the great
numbers of people unemployed at the time).
33. See Caste, supra note 32, at 15 (stating that the moralistic characterization of poverty
was limited to a conservative ideology. Even liberals buy into the description of poverty as
affecting only deviants); see also KATZ, supra note 21, at 166-84.
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society and became a description of the moral characteristics of
individuals.34
For reasons of convenience, power, or moral judgment, society
selects from among a myriad of traits and then sorts people, objects
and situations into categories, which we then treat as real." Adher-
ence to the mythology that the poor are undeserving continues as a
strong source of political rhetoric. The question that must be asked is
why the public and politicians insist on holding on to representations
of the poor as morally deviant, despite evidence to the contrary. It
has been suggested that the better-off classes perceive the poor to be
threatening to their legitimacy.36 The poor are perceived to threaten
their safety, political influence, economic security, and moral values. 7
This article concerns the last of these four, the perceived threat to
moral values. This is the stumbling block for many young lawyers.
Moral value threats are perceived dangers to what is believed to
be culturally and morally proper.38 Those who assiduously practice
mainstream values, sometimes on religious grounds, may feel person-
ally attacked by behavior that threatens their moral values. Threats to
values can actually be seen as threats to safety.39 But what does the
general population know about the values of the poor? Relevant so-
cial science data has been collected regarding the values of the poor,
but our American mythology ignores the data because it establishes
that the poor have values similar to our own. The mythology depends
on the assumption that most behavior is caused by the holding and
34. See GANS, supra note 22, at 27-57 (describing the process by which the description of
under-class began as a specific economic description without an assigned negative moral value,
and became, through misuse by journalists and social scientists, a term referring to a perma-
nently disenfranchised, alienated class of the population, which is perceived by others to be
primarily young black and Latino males, and young black teenage mothers on welfare); see also
Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563 (1996)
(book review).
35. KATZ, supra note 21, at 236 ("When we identify one thing as unlike others we are divid-
ing the world; we use our language of 'them' or 'us' for the most part, Americans have talked
about the poor as 'them."' In addition, Katz states that even in the language of social science,
poor people are usually portrayed as outsiders, to be pitied or despised, but never seen as com-
plex, multifaceted, full citizens); see also HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 23, at 17 (describ-
ing the welfare system as doing "real things," including regulating behavior).
36. See GANS, supra note 22, at 78 (identifying four reasons why there is adherence to the
undeserving poor theory: (1) because it is perceived that they provide an actual threat to the
security of more prosperous classes; (2) that there is an imagined threat, where there is no rea-
sonable evidence of a real threat; (3) that there is an exaggerated threat; and (4) that there is a
displaced threat).
37. See id. at 78-82.
38. See id. at 82.
39. See id.
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practicing of values, with good behavior resulting from good values
and bad behavior from bad values." The poor, then, are poor be-
cause they have bad values. Economic, political, social, and other
structural complexities are not factored into whether the poor have
the ability to carry out mainstream values." There is no question that
the poor and the more affluent engage in many of the same behaviors
that threaten moral value. The difference for the poor is that they
cannot mask their inability or unwillingness to practice mainstream
behavior, whereas the middle and upper classes can cloak such behav-
ior.42 The inability of the poor to shield themselves from the gaze of
judgmental middle and upper classes leaves them vulnerable to deval-
uation by others.
B. What are Values and How Do They Determine Who
Is Worthy?
Societal values, attitudes, and stereotypic beliefs dominate our
thinking about the poor. The cultural belief that poverty is a result of
some personal moral failure of the individual as opposed to a factor of
some external conditions is highly significant.43 Despite the fact that
empirical evidence fails to demonstrate any difference between the
objectives and values of poor people as compared to others with
means, people stubbornly hang on to the belief that poor people can
be divided into groups that are deserving and undeserving." Beliefs
40. See id. at 83.
41. See id. (pointing out that those who constitute the mainstream feel sure that their values
are mainstream. And since they know nothing about the values of the poor, they have no way of
determining whether what they perceive as moral value threats from the poor, have anything to
do with the values).
42. See id. at 83-84 (postulating that a middle-class woman going through a break up of her
marriage may be able to rely on a network of family for economic and social backup until fi-
nances stabilize, whereas a poor woman will not have that option. A drug addict from a well-to-
do family will be able to use health insurance to deal with addiction, or will use drugs in the
privacy of his or her living room, rather than out in public. Upper-class men who have inherited
wealth, and do not wish to work, can live off interest income, whereas poor men who do not
want to work are merely labeled lazy).
43. See Joe R. Feagin, We Still Believe That God Helps Those Who Help Themselves,
PSYCHOL. TODAY, Nov. 1992, at 101-29.
44. See, e.g., Chandler Davidson & Charles M. Gaitz, Are the Poor Different? A Compari-
son of Work Behavior and Attitudes Among the Urban Poor and Non-Poor, 22 Soc. PROaLEMS
229 (1974) (study showed that poor and non-poor had similar attitudes towards work, and that
poor would continue to work in situations where the non-poor would stop); see also Katherine S.
Newman, What Scholars Can Tell Politicians About the Poor, in RACE, CLASS AND GENDER IN
THE UNITED STATES: AN INTEGRATED STUDY 249-54 (1998) (describing a study where working
poor in Harlem were tracked over a period of time. The study revealed that despite lack of
adequate job opportunities, the working poor continued to search diligently for employment).
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about how society should be organized and operated are rooted in our
basic values and norms.45 The connection between values, group atti-
tudes and behavior was extensively developed by psychologist Milton
Rokeach. 46 He defined a value as "an enduring belief that a specific
mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially
preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of
existence. '47  Rokeach believed that values have cognitive, affective,
and behavioral components: that the mind conceives them, they can
cause one to be emotional, and that they can lead to action. 48  His
research established that a person's value system organization could
be a reliable predictor of individual behavior.49  In his research
Rokeach identified thirty-six values, which he considered representa-
tive of the core values held by people." Of these thirty-six values, he
categorized half as "terminal" values,51 those worth pursuing for their
own sake, and the other half as "instrumental" values, those useful for
achieving terminal values.5" These thirty-six values were used to form
the Rokeach Value Survey. 3 Rokeach surveyed a large segment of
the American public during the late sixties to determine its views and
45. See MILTON ROKEACH, THE NATURE OF HUMAN VALUES 19 (1973) (noting that values
are distinguished from norms for three reasons: (1) values refer to mode of behavior or end-state
existence, whereas norms only refer to behavior; (2) a social norm is a prescription or proscrip-
tion to behave in a specific way in a specific situation, while values transcend specific situations;
and (3) a norm is consensual and external to the person, whereas a value is more personal and
internal).
46. See id. at 7.
47. Id. at 5.
48. See id. at 7 (noting the differences between a moral value, which is a narrower concept,
from a general value. Moreover, he defines a moral value as referring only to certain kinds of
instrumental values with an interpersonal focus. When violated, moral values arouse pangs of
conscience, or feelings of guilt for wrongdoing).
49. See id. at 5 ("[A] value system is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning prefera-
ble modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum of relative importance."); see
also id. at 18 (stating that "an attitude differs from a value in that an attitude refers to an organi-
zation of several beliefs around a specific object or situation").
50. See id. at 28; see also id. at 11-12 (noting that theorists have offered various estimates for
the number of core values. Rokeach arrived at the number thirty-six by asking participants in
studies to list important principles, then by cross-matching the lists to determine which principles
were always stated. Those principles constitute his thirty-six core values).
51. See id. at 28 (stating that the terminal values are: a world at peace, family security,
freedom, happiness, self-respect, wisdom, equality, salvation, a comfortable life, a sense of ac-
complishment, true friendship, national security, inner harmony, mature love, a world of beauty,
social recognition, pleasure, and an exciting life).
52. See id. at 28 (stating that the instrumental values are: being honest, ambitious, responsi-
ble, forgiving, broad-minded, courageous, helpful, clean, capable, self-controlled, loving, cheer-
ful, independent, polite, intellectual, obedient, logical, and imaginative).
53. See id. (noting that a subject taking the Rokeach Value Survey is asked to rank the
values. The most important value is numbered one, and the least important is numbered thirty-
six).
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attitudes toward various issues S4 From the gathered data, Rokeach
sought correlations between the survey participants' value systems
and their attitudes toward issues such as civil rights, crime, religion,
the Vietnam War, student protest, and political parties.55
Rokeach concluded that there were certain single values, which
were significant in determining attitudes. In the civil rights area, for
example, he found that there was a strong correlation between sub-
jects who gave a low rank to equality and those who demonstrated
intolerance toward blacks.56 Rokeach also deemed "salvation" and
"being obedient" as significant values to societal attitudes. These val-
ues have been closely associated with conservatism and endorsement
of the Protestant Work Ethic (PWE).57 Values associated with PWE
have central importance in North American society.58 Studies have
examined the relationship between PWE and attitudes towards the
poor.59 PWE is positively related to negative attitudes toward the
poor.6° Endorsers of PWE assign more importance to values such as
54. See id. at 55 (noting that in 1968, the National Opinion Research Center administered
the Value Survey to adults over the age of twenty-one).
55. See id.
56. See id. at 68; see also Kwan Chun Lee, The Problem of Appropriateness of the Rokeach
Value System in Korea, 26 INT'L J. OF PSYCHOL. 299-310 (1991) (arguing that the Rokeach ap-
proach to values and the significance that single values play in predicting behavior is ineffective
in cross-cultural environments. Lee notes the difficulty in using the measure when the culture
has values that are not included within the thirty-six. However, despite the criticism, the
Rokeach Value Survey is still used as the basis of much of the work on values).
57. See ADRIAN FURNHAM, THE PROTESTANT WORK ETIIC: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WORK-
RELATED BELIEFS AND BEHAVIORS 176 (1990) (stating that laziness and idleness - any condition
of worklessness - grow out of a source of evil and a failure to impose discipline. The Protestant
Work Ethic (PWE) stresses the virtue of hard work, self-discipline, the denial of pleasure for its
own sake, and individual activism as a person attempts to fulfill his or her own calling or voca-
tion); see also N.T. Feather, Protestant Ethic, Conservatism, and Values, 46 J. OF PERSONALITY
AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 1132-41 (1989) (noting that while religious views do have a bearing on
PWE, the ethic itself is not derived from the specific beliefs of any one particular religious
group). See generally Herbert L. Mirels & James B. Garret, The Protestant Ethic as a Personality
Variable, 36 J. OF CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 40-44 (1971) (stating that the terms
conservative and PWE are used to mean persons endorsing the values associated with the terms.
In this sense, the terms themselves are value free. However, I realize the difficulty of extracting
words from what may be their known social context, I encourage the reader to refrain from
taking offense at the use of the terms as they are recognized by the social sciences as terms that
describe valid phenomenon).
58. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 COR-
NELL L. RFV. 523, 531 (1997) (noting that as far back as colonial New England, work has been
invested with an almost religious character).
59. See A.P. McDonald, More on the Protestant Ethic, 39 J. OF CONSULTING AND CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 116-22 (1972).
60. See id. at 120 (stating that subjects who strongly endorsed PWE were negative in their
attitudes toward the poor).
[VOL. 44:257
Full Legal Representation
salvation, being obedient and self controlled.61 They have a
worldview that sees progress as taking place within the context of a
legitimate authority.62 From this view, order and predictability are
fundamental.63 For a person who endorses PWE and embraces ste-
reotypes of the poor, the disorderly work of a poor person would
threaten normative values and evoke resentment.
The interaction between values and worldview may be highly rel-
evant to the work of the poverty lawyer. In general, lawyers assume
that for most purposes their clients' lives are orderly.64 The client who
has the financial resources to pay a lawyer only comes to see a lawyer
when the unusual or unexpected disrupts the orderly task of living.65
Once the interfering or upsetting factor is resolved, with the lawyer's
assistance, the client returns to an orderly life.66 The client living in
poverty does not fit that description. The lack of sufficient economic
resources can inject a constant level of instability and chaos into the
client's life. This may be overwhelming to a lawyer, and may even
inhibit the lawyer's ability to understand how or why the client's situa-
tion does not materially improve after the lawyering interaction.67
Rokeach also polled subjects nationwide about their attitudes to-
wards benefits for the poor.68  The ranking of equality was again
61. See Feather, supra note 57, at 1135 (noting that subjects who strongly endorsed PWE
also tended to rank the value of equality lower); see also McDonald, supra note 59, at 121 (sug-
gesting that the low ranking of equality is consistent with the Calvinist doctrine of the elect, i.e.,
specific persons were prechosen by God for salvation, hence, men are not equal at birth. Also,
the accumulation of wealth was taken as a sign that one was a member of the elect).
62. See Feather, supra note 57, at 1140.
63. See id.
64. See Steven Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People. 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1969-70).
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See infra comments in Part III.B (regarding the inability of Legal Services lawyers to
materially affect their client's lives); see also Robert Rader, Confessions of Guilt: A Clinic Stu-
dent's Reflections on Representing Indigent Criminal Defendants, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 299 (1994)
(noting clinical student's frustration with depth of clients' problems).
68. See ROKEACH, supra note 45, at 103-04 (noting that in addition to completing the Value
Survey, the participants were asked a series of questions about the use of public funds to aid the
poor. For example, Question #8 asked: "which is more to blame if a person is poor - lack of
effort on his own part or circumstances beyond his control?" The choices were: circumstances,
both, or lack of effort. Respondents were then classified according to the range of scores. The
possible scores ranged from -10 to +10. Those scores ranging from +4 to +10 were considered
"sympathetic to the poor"; "in between" ranged from -3 to +3; and "unsympathetic to the poor"
ranged from -4 to -10.
The national study asked the participants to evaluate ten statements that were constructed
to elicit reactions about the poor and their right to medical and dental care, education, and
minimum standards of living. Question #4 asked "whether every person has a right to adequate
housing even if he can't afford it." The participants had five choices: agree strongly, agree some-
what, don't know, disagree somewhat or disagree strongly).
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found to be a discriminating value.69 Rokeach categorized the re-
sponses as being sympathetic to the poor, in between, or unsympa-
thetic. Responses in these three categories correspond with
participants whose average rank for equality was fifth, tenth, and thir-
teenth respectively among Rokeach's eighteen terminal values.70
Rokeach determined how the value patterns of those with unsympa-
thetic views towards the poor were strongly correlated with levels of
those who value salvation, and only somewhat correlated with levels
of affluence and education. 71
As the value system theory continued to develop, Rokeach pro-
posed that there was a connection between values and group attitudes
toward group members. He theorized that prejudice is based on
group belief that members of an outgroup do not hold the same values
as the ingroup.72 The theory, called "belief congruence," remains an
important concept in the literature on the causes and explanations of
racism.7 3 Other scholars have attempted to build on the Rokeach the-
69. See id. at 103.
70. See id. (noting that the respondents unsympathetic to the poor ranked as high-in-prior-
ity the "values of a sense of accomplishment, national security, salvation, wisdom, being inde-
pendent, responsible and self-controlled").
71. See id. at 105 (stating that the results should not be read as indicating that the affluent
and the salvation-minded are generally unsympathetic to the poor, but rather, that a certain
segment of each group was less sympathetic than the general population. Similarly, Rokeach
found that the value systems of those prejudiced against blacks were not the same as those who
were unsympathetic to the poor, although there were some similarities between the two).
72. See Milton Rokeach & G. Rothman. The Principle of Belief Congruence and the Con-
gruity Principle as Models of Cognitive Interaction, 72 PSYCHOL. REV. 128-42 (1965) (noting that
a similar concept in law is interest convergence); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion and the Interest- Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) (arguing that whites
permitted some civil rights advancement because it was in their best interests to do so. When
remedies ceased to coincide with the interests of whites, they ceased to support them).
73. See, e.g., John B. McConahay, Modern Racism, Ambivalence, and The Modern Racism
Scale, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 91-125 (John F. Dovido et al. eds., 1986)
(noting that McConahay used the Rokeach Value Survey as a tool to help demonstrate the exis-
tence of what he calls modern or symbolic racism. A separate instrument, called the modern
racism scale, is employed along with the Value Survey to determine whether the survey will be
predictive of the behavior of those who scale high in anti-black feelings on the Modern Racism
Scale (MRS)); see also Irwin Katz & R. Glen Hass, Racial Ambivalence, Value Duality, and
Behavior, in PREJIJDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 35-59 (John F. Dovido et al. eds., 1986)
[hereinafter Racial Ambivalence] (explaining that Katz and Hass used the Rokeach Value Sur-
vey to explore a concept they call "racial ambivalence." Essentially, the theory is that Ameri-
cans have at least two types of core value systems that conflict with each other: individual values
as reflected in the PWE, which lead to anti-black feelings, and humanitarianlegalitarian, which
lead to pro-black feelings); Irwin Katz & R. Glen Hass, Racial Ambivalence and American Value
Conflict, 55 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 893-905 (1988) [hereinafter American
Value]; Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE,
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACIsM 61-89 (John F. Dovido et al. eds., 1986) (noting that Dovidio and
Gaertner have developed the concept of aversive racism. Here it is believed that many Ameri-
cans have strong egalitarian self-concepts, which should lead them to be non-prejudiced. How-
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ory to create a general theory, which explains prejudice towards any
outgroup. 74 Two propositions are currently being presented that de-
fine which values are likely to be implicated in outgroup attitudes.
The first proposition suggests that humanitarianism/egalitarianism are
a prejudice antidote in that they are values that are negatively associ-
ated with all measures of prejudice and discrimination. The second
proposition is that the values implicated in outgroup rejection will de-
pend on the content of dominant stereotypes76 of a particular out-
group. 77 If the stereotype of any group suggests that members do not
uphold a particular value, then an individual's endorsement of that
value will predict rejection of members of that outgroup. 8 When the
stereotype suggests that a group does not support a particular value,
then the endorsement of that value by an individual will predict a
higher degree of negative feeling towards that group for the individ-
ual.7 1 "Consensual" stereotypes are shared beliefs possessed by mem-
bers of a social group, ascribed characteristics for which there is
considerable agreement.8" "Individual" stereotypes include all char-
acteristics that an individual attributes to members of a social group,
whether consensual or idiosyncratic.81 In addition to general and indi-
ever, because of the racist nature of American culture, racist beliefs and feelings among
American whites is the rule. The conflict caused by the collision of these positions causes aver-
sive racists to force negative thoughts out of existence. Hence, negative beliefs are not often
acknowledged. In situations where the egalitarian value is threatened, aversive racists will
demonstrate pro-black feelings. Where the egalitarian situation is not threatened, or the situa-
tion is ambiguous, relatively anti-black behavior will result).
74. See Monica Biernat et al., Values and Prejudice: Toward Understanding the Impact of
American Values on Outgroup Attitudes, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VALUES 155 (Seligman et al.
eds., 1996).
75. Id. at 155 (stating that the humanitarian/egalitarian value orientations are those that
embrace democratic and humanitarian precepts such as equality); see Racial Ambivalence, supra
note 73, at 42 (noting that the other core value orientation is individualism, which has an empha-
sis on personal freedom, self-reliance, devotion to work, and achievement).
76. See Bern P. Allen, African Americans' and European Americans' Mutual Attributions:
Adjective Generation Technique (AGT) Stereotyping, 26 J. OF APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 884, 890
(1996) (stating that "'stereotype' is defined as a trait or label that individuals attribute to mem-
bers of a group when the attributers are free to select any trait word in their descriptive reper-
toires. The individuals perceive it to be a trait possessed by the group members, individually or
collectively").
77. See Racial Ambivalence, supra note 73, at 42.
78. See id. (noting that the authors give examples of stereotypes that homosexuals are often
perceived as violating traditional "family values" and fat people as violating moral values con-
cerning discipline, hard work, delay of gratification, and will power).
79. See id. at 156.
80. See Victor Esses et al., Values, Stereotypes, and Emotions as Determinations of Inter-
group Attitudes, in AFFECT, COGNITION, AND STEREOTYPING 137 (Diane Mackie et al. eds.,
1993).
81. See id. at 139 (explaining that consensual beliefs are ones that are held as a result of
group consensus; that is, all members of the group hold the view. An idiosyncratic view is held
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vidual beliefs about specific characteristics possessed by members of a
social group, more general, abstract beliefs may contribute to inter-
group attitudes.8 2 "Symbolic beliefs," for example, are those that so-
cial groups violate or uphold as cherished values and norms.83 The
social psychology literature discussed above gives us a better context
to understand what values really are and what they can mean in the
context of legal representation.
III. THE STUDY AND THE FUTURE
A. Values and the Law Student Study
As a clinician, I am concerned about the attitudes and value judg-
ments which my students make about their clients. After graduation,
and without further clinical training, many of these students will actu-
ally represent people. Worse, students need not participate in any
clinical practice prior to graduation.' Most students get no training
on learning to appreciate or value clients." For that reason, the atti-
tudes and values a law student has while in school are very important
because they are likely to persist into practice. In class exercises, I
have experimented with hypotheticals that asked students to describe
the service they would render to specifically described clients. For
example:
1. What if you have an elderly black client who has been arrested
for the second time in an eighteen-month period for DUI. He
despite the fact that it is not widely shared by the group, and may be based on an isolated
incident).
82. See id.
83. See id. at 139 (noting that symbolic beliefs include the PWE and humanitarianism/egali-
tarianism); Racial Ambivalence, supra note 73, at 43 (noting that additional values may include
the belief that the poor threaten the moral fiber of society).
84. A colleague was fond of saying that if how we trained law students was compared to
training medical students, it would be comparable to showing a medical student a book on brain
surgery and then allowing her, without ever having practiced the procedure, to perform surgery
the day after graduating. There has been criticism of the failure of legal education to expose law
students to the realities of practice, see MacCrate, TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at 240; see also
Roger C. Cramton, Professional Education in Medicine and Law: Structural Differences, Com-
mon Failings, Possible Opportunities, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 349 (1985-86) (noting that 50% of
medical school training is clinical whereas in law school a miniscule numbers of hours of clinical
education are permitted but not required); id. (estimating that most law schools devote substan-
tially less than 10% of student credit hours to clinical education).
85. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF
LAw: A PROORESSIVE CRITIQUE 38, 65 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1990) (describing traditional
law school skill teaching as being done in isolation from actual lawyering experience, and point-
ing out the marginalization of courses, such as the clinics, where alternate teaching methodolo-
gies are employed).
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missed several appointments, so you send an investigator to
the client's house. It turns out the client's spouse is bedridden
and the costs of her health care are stretching the couple's
meager resources to the limit. The investigator suspects the
client may have a problem with alcoholism .. . 86 you agree
with the investigator that the client is an alcoholic. For pur-
poses of representing the client on the current DUI charge,
how would you deal with the issue of his alcoholism? Specify
the steps you would take in representing this client.
2. Imagine that you have completed clinic successfully. To your
surprise you are hired by a decent sized firm that is building up
its criminal defense practice. The firm does both civil and
criminal work. One of the BIG clients (brings in lots of money
to the firm) has a son who has been arrested for possession of
drug paraphernalia. It's the son's second arrest in the past two
years. The son is approximately 19 years old and is a student
in the state university system. Other than his previous arrest,
he is basically a good kid, but it appears that he may have a
drug addiction. Your senior partner knows you completed
clinic, so you are assigned the case. What steps would you
take to provide zealous representation to this client?87
The clients have different racial and class characteristics but their legal
problems are very similar. Initially, when I developed the hypotheti-
cal I wanted to determine whether a student's reason for providing
different levels of representation could be pinpointed. If it could be
pinpointed, what qualities about the client triggered the willingness to
give different levels or representation? Most semesters, at least one
third of the class offered a lesser level of service to the older black
man. The students took a much less aggressive stance in terms of pro-
viding counseling recommendations. When asked what they would
advise regarding the drinking problem, the students said they would
"encourage" him to seek treatment for his alcoholism or "advise" him
of the availability of treatment. 8 For the young male client however,
the language was aggressive: they would "get" him in a drug treatment
program. When asked to discuss the difference in the language in
86. See Exercise 37 for University of Florida Criminal Clinic (finding that most students
will, after assuring themselves that it is both necessary and safe to do so, express a willingness to
go to the client's house) (on file with the author).
87. Id.
88. See Example Student Answer (on file with the author).
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class, the students had a hard time explaining why they chose different
language. One student commented: "If we don't go all out for the old
man, nothing will happen to us." It seemed to be a revelation to the
class that they associated a cost to themselves if they do not provide
aggressive service to the young male.89 My question concerning the
cost to the old man for less aggressive service produced an uneasy
silence. They have not assigned a cost to themselves for not providing
aggressive service to the old man, so it will be difficult to admit that
they accept the possibility that the poorer client will pay the price of a
harsher sentence, extended probation and/or a lengthier criminal re-
cord. The results of this exercise suggest that the students do make
value judgments about their clients and that those values cause them
to act in a way that dictates a difference in the quality and quantity of
service to be rendered to clients when nothing objectively requires
differential rendering of service.9"
That some law students believe poor clients do not deserve qual-
ity service strongly suggests that some lawyers may believe the same.
The idea that poor clients are less worthy does fit the widely held be-
lief that the poor are generally unworthy or undeserving because of
their own moral deficiencies. 9 Lawyers, however, are supposed to
stand above personal predilections and promote the best interests of
their clients.
I consulted with a psychologist, Lisa Brown,92 to devise a study to
measure a law student's value priorities, ability to tolerate difference,
and anxiety in dealing with groups that were different.93 Three instru-
89. See, e.g., Ann Southworth, Lawyer-Client Decision-making in Civil Rights and Poverty
Practice, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 4 (1996) (citing a study conducted with public interest lawyers
in Chicago. Many lawyers admitted that they feel entitled to engage in decision-making that
does not involve the client when the client is not paying, as opposed to when the lawyer is
dependent on a fee).
90. As yet, it is not totally clear why the older man receives less service. It could be because
he is black or because he is poor. It could be some combination of the two. There is a possibility
that his status as a senior might provoke the reaction; however, I believe this less likely since the
elderly are generally seen as deserving. Another possibility might be a value judgment about the
client's alcohol addiction. However, the young male may have a drug problem. The possibility
of drug use was viewed as highly suspect by the students. They seemed willing to believe that
drug addiction was a ruse and that the male really did not have a drug problem. Perhaps in this
they compared him with their own college experiences and were willing to see the drug use as
experimental or recreational. This led to some skepticism about whether the male deserved
advocacy of drug treatment. Nonetheless, doubts were cast to his benefit.
91. See supra Part II.A.
92. Assistant Professor of Social Psychology at the University of Florida.
93. Dr. Lisa Brown graciously adapted a study she was conducting among undergraduates
at the University of Florida to include the law students. The results of the larger study are
contained in an as yet unpublished manuscript. My own interest in these areas was piqued while
[VOL. 44:257
Full Legal Representation
ments for measuring such attitudes were suggested: the Rokeach
Value Ranking,94 the Protestant Ethic Scale,9" and the Humanitarian-
Egalitarian Scale. 96 These instruments comprised "Survey 1" of the
pilot study, which also contained some Gallup Poll-style questions
concerning political orientation and an open-ended expression of the
participant's perceptions of a selected outgroup.97
"Survey 2" inquired into outgroup perceptions and contacts. It
comprised the Intergroup Anxiety Scale98 and a confidential request
for information about the student's ethnicity. Participants of color re-
ceived questions about their perception of racism and discrimination
in the U.S., while white participants received the Modern Racism
Scale.99
"Survey 3" contained six scenarios describing a lawyer's interac-
tion with a client, designed to test my hypothesis that the students'
attitudes toward the poor would lead them to provide less than full
levels of representation. After reading each scenario, the students
were asked to what degree the lawyer provided zealous
representation. 100
The pilot study was conducted at four schools between October
1994 and April 1996. In total, sixty-nine surveys were completed. The
participation of the schools is indicated in Table I. Procedural safe-
guards were designed to ensure anonymity, 01 voluntariness,0 2 and in-
completing the research for an article about the absence of any discussion concerning race and
class in the client-centered counseling materials. See Michelle S. Jacobs, People From The Foot-
notes: The Missing Element in Client Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 345, 391-
401 (1997) [hereinafter Jacobs, People] (exploring the possibility that lawyers value priorities and
intergroup anxiety may affect the ability to render counseling services).
94. See ROKEACH, supra note 45, at 1.
95. See Racial Ambivalence, supra note 73, at 75.
96. See id.
97. For students of color, the outgroup was European Americans. For the white students,
the outgroup was African Americans.
98. See Walter G. Stephan & Cookie White Stephan, Intergroup Anxiety, 41 J. OF Soc.
ISSUES 157 (1985). A copy of Survey 2 is on file with the author.
99. See McConahay, supra note 73, at 98 (proposing that the Modern Racism Scale was
developed to measure whether whites continued to hold stereotypical beliefs about blacks after
the civil rights era ended).
100. See text and notes infra, pp. 282-85 for discussion of the hypotheticals. See Jacobs, Peo-
ple, supra note 93, at 422, Appendix, Table 6, for the full list of hypotheticals. A copy of Survey
3 is on file with the author. Students participating in the full study prior to April 1995 did not
receive Survey 3.
101. Each study was identified by school only; there was no way to tie an individual response
to an individual student. The anonymity was important because the Modern Racism Scale in-
cluded a free response section. in which each student was asked to write about how they felt
when interacting with the outgroup.
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dependence.10 3 As designed, the study sought to demonstrate two
things: (1) a meaningful quantitative model of law students' systems of
values and (2) a link between students' value systems and their per-
ceptions of zealous representation. The study was administered to a
total of seven clinical courses.
B. The Students' Value Ranking
The pilot study was comprised of sixty-nine surveys completed
between October 1994 and April 1996, representing four law schools:
TABLE I
LAW SCHOOL PARTICIPANTS PERCENT
University of Florida College of Law (UF) 46104 66.7
Golden Gate University School of Law (GG) 10 14.5
University of San Diego Law School (USD) 6 8.7
Brooklyn Law School (BLS) 7 10.1
The students in the total sample were predominantly white, reflecting
the reality of enrollment in American law schools, excluding the
historically black institutions. The numbers of black students at the
two California schools and Brooklyn Law were too small to obtain
individual school data specifically on the black students." 5
102. 1 solicited volunteers by announcing the study on the clinical list server, and by promot-
ing the project at various clinical conferences. The study was directed toward law students in
clinical programs, because clinical students are self-selected. The clinical courses are not
mandatory, and many clinical students are likely to be candidates for public interest positions.
Each participant was told that the participation was voluntary, and that they were not required
to complete the study in order to obtain class credit. Not all participants finished the study and
some refused to answer questions, which was permitted.
103. No student's course grade was dependent upon participation in the study and all stu-
dents could terminate participation at anytime. Where possible, the study was administered at
the beginning of the semester to limit "tainting" from the students' exposure to their clinical
professor's personal philosophy.
104. The students at the University of Florida were all third year law students. At the
remaining schools, the students were second and third year law students.
105. The ethnic breakdown of the total sample was as follows:
ETHNICITY Frequency PERCENT
Afr.-Am./Caribbean 11 15.9
Asian American 1 1.4
Biracial/Multi 3 4.3
Euro-Am./White 39 56.5
Latino/Hispanic 1 1.4
Other 3 4.2
Not Disclosed 11 15.9
Total: 69 100.0
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Even with the small sample size, the study achieved its first goal -
determining how law students ranked values.1t 6 The Rokeach
research demonstrated equality was a pivotal value, and that its
ranking against other values could predict behavior." 7 In the law
student sample, the mean ranking for equality was 9.5, tied for ninth
among the eighteen values.'08 This was consistent with attitudes
towards the poor that are neither sympathetic nor anti-poor.10 9 Six
values, including happiness, received maximum rankings that were
lower than equality, meaning those six values were perceived to be
more important than equality.
TABLE II
RANKINGS OF VALUES FOR THE TOTAL SAMPLE
Value Mean1 1 t  Std Dev1 1 t  Highest Lowest
Self-respect 5.04 3.63 1 15
Happiness 5.81 4.11 1 16
True friendship 6.03 2.92 1 15
Freedom 6.65 4.21 1 18
Family security 6.66 3.94 1 16
Mature love 6.71 4.01 1 18
Inner harmony 7.15 4.82 1 17
Wisdom 8.52 4.53 1 17
Equality 9.55 4.98 1 18
A sense of accomplishment 9.85 3.76 3 18
A comfortable life 10.73 4.64 1 18
Pleasure 11.12 3.69 3 18
A world at peace 11.19 5.42 1 18
An exciting life 11.61 4.14 1 18
Salvation 12.63 6.73 1 18
Social recognition 13.42 3.33 3 18
A world of beauty 13.74 3.46 3 18
National security 14.91 2.88 7 18
106. Results of the total sample are contained in Table II.
107. See id.
108. Equality ranked as high as first and as low as eighteen. Only two other values, salvation
and a world at peace, varied this much.
109. Using the same eighteen categories, Rokeach's national study showed that those
sympathetic to the poor ranked equality fifth, and that those with anti-poor attitudes ranked
equality thirteenth. The middle position, neither sympathetic nor anti-poor, ranked equality
tenth.
110. The mean is the numerical average of the student's rankings. Note that lower numbers
indicate a higher ranking and a greater importance.
111. Standard deviation ("Std Dev") is an indicator of the data's variability from the mean.
The larger the standard deviation, the more variability.
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When the schools were examined individually, differences in the
equality rankings began to appear. 12 At the University of San Diego,
equality was ranked tenth. No San Diego student ranked equality
highest or lowest, but the standard deviation indicated more variabil-
ity than any other value. The variation in student attitudes toward
equality even exceeded that of salvation, which was typically the most
variable among Rokeach's eighteen "terminal" values. The mean
rank among the San Diego students, however, reflected a middle view
of the poor, consistent with Rokeach's national survey.
Golden Gate Law School students ranked equality as the fifth
most important value. This ranking was more consistent with views
sympathetic to the poor." 3 In both California schools, the values as-
sociated with hedonistic interest - a comfortable life, an exciting life,
and pleasure - all ranked below equality.
TABLE III
RANKING OF VALUES FOR UNIVERSITY OF
SAN DIEGO STUDENTS
Value Mean Std Dev Highest Lowest
Self-respect 3.67 1.75 2 7
Inner harmony 4.00 2.68 1 7
True friendship 5.17 .98 4 6
Happiness 5.60 4.39 1 12
Freedom 6.83 4.54 1 13
Family security 7.00 5.02 1 13
Mature love 7.00 1.58 5 9
A world at peace 7.00 4.34 1 12-
A sense of accomplishment 7.50 2.26 5 11
Equality 9.67 5.68 2 17
Wisdom 10.67 4.89 3 16
A comfortable life 12.00 2.19 9 15
An exciting life 12.83 2.93 8 16
A world of beauty 13.17 4.02 7 18
Pleasure 13.83 1.47 12 16
Social recognition 15.00 1.67 12 17
National security 15.67 3.14 10 18
Salvation 15.83 4.36 7 18
Students at Brooklyn Law School ranked equality ninth among
the values, consistent with the national sample and with the law school
total sample. Equality tied with "a comfortable life," for the highest
standard of deviation. As with USD, no one ranked equality as the
112. See Table III for the USD results.
113. Results for Golden Gate University School of Law appear below in Table IV.
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TABLE IV
RANKING OF VALUES FOR GOLDEN GATE
LAW STUDENTS
Value Mean Std Dev Highest Lowest
Self-respect 4.80 3.99 1 12
True friendship 5.00 2.21 2 9
Family security 6.40 3.31 1 11
Freedom 6.60 2.91 1 10
Equality 6.90 5.38 1 15
Wisdom 7.00 4.00 1 15
Inner harmony 7.10 5.84 2 16
Happiness 7,33 5.24 1 16
Mature love 7.80 5.12 2 17
Pleasure 9.90 3.93 5 18
An exciting life 10.60 4.01 4 15
A world at peace 11.10 6.33 1 18
A sense of accomplishment 11.30 3.33 7 18
A world of beauty 11.90 3.81 3 17
A comfortable life 13.20 3.85 5 18
National security 14.00 3.16 7 17
Social recognition 14.30 2.36 11 18
Salvation 16.56 2.24 11 18
most important value but no student ranked it as the least important
either. Only one hedonistic value was ranked above equality - a com-
fortable life. However, eleven other values received maximum rank-
ings that were lower than the maximum ranking for equality. If there
is a perception that the East Coast is more liberal than other parts of
the country, the rankings of these students did not bear that out.
At first blush, the rankings of the students at the University of
Florida appeared similar to the other schools. For all UF students
combined, equality ranked tenth, consistent with the total law student
sample. Compared with the national results, the students' ranking of
equality reflected attitudes that were neither sympathetic to the poor
nor anti-poor. The white students ranked equality as high as one and
as low as eighteen. The University of Florida did not rank among the
top three in the size of the standard deviation. All three hedonistic
values ranked lower, that is, they were perceived to be less important,
than equality. The results of the total UF sample are contained in
Table VI below.
Since such a large number of responses were from UF, it was pos-
sible to break out the rankings of the students of color from the white
students. The difference in the rankings was startling. When the stu-
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TABLE V
RANKING OF VALUES FOR BROOKLYN
LAW STUDENTS
Value Mean Std Dev Highest Lowest
Inner harmony 4.86 3.02 2 9
Self-respect 5.14 4.95 1 12
Family security 5.57 1.90 3 8
True friendship 5.86 4.14 3 15
Mature love 6.14 4.41 1 13
Happiness 6.14 4.67 2 14
A comfortable life 7.57 5.65 1 16
Freedom 8.14 4.45 1 13
Equality 8.57 5.65 2 17
A sense of accomplishment 9.14 2.34 6 13
Pleasure 10.14 3.98 6 15
Wisdom 11.57 2.88 7 16
A world at peace 12.86 4.56 4 17
An exciting life 13.00 5.39 3 17
National security 13.57 3.41 9 17
Social recognition 14.14 2.61 10 18
Salvation 14.29 4.86 5 18
A world of beauty 14.29 4.35 7 18
dents of color were removed from the total UF sample, equality's
ranking plummeted dramatically. The white students ranked it thir-
teenth. According to the national study, a ranking of thirteen placed
these students in the spectrum of those endorsing anti-poor attitudes.
Pleasure and a comfortable life were ranked as being more important
than equality. The results of the data for white UF students are con-
tained in Table VII below. On the other hand, the students of color at
UF ranked equality fifth, the same as GG students. Interestingly, no
UF student of color ranked equality as the most important value, but
none ranked it below thirteenth. Among the white students, however,
some students had selected equality as the most important while
others selected it as the least important. The students of color ranked
all of the hedonistic values below equality. The results of the value
rankings for UF students of color are found in Table VIII below.
Without the students of color, the UF students reflected what could be
interpreted as a very conservative and potentially anti-poor ranking.
Their low endorsement of the value of equality may indicate less tol-
erance of outgroups. The preliminary data show interesting findings
in the ranking of humanitarian/egalitarian and conservative values.
Salvation, ordinarily associated with conservative values, was strongly
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endorsed by the UF students of color. No other student group ranked
salvation in the top half of the values. Because conservative values
and PWE can be good predictors of many beliefs including intoler-
ance of outgroups and anti-poor attitudes, the results here raise a few
questions and are worthy of a further look.
TABLE VI
RANKING OF VALUES FOR ALL UF STUDENTS
Value Mean Std Dev Highest Lowest
Self-respect 5.27 3.58 1 15
Happiness 5.47 3.81 1 14
Freedom 6.40 4.46 1 18
True friendship 6.42 3.02 1 13
Mature love 6.52 3.94 1 18
Family security 6.84 4.23 1 16
Inner harmony 7.95 4.85 1 17
Wisdom 8.09 4.62 1 17
A sense of accomplishment 9.95 4.08 3 18
Equality 10.30 4.62 1 18
A comfortable life 10.50 4.65 1 18
Salvation 11.09 7.40 1 18
Pleasure 11.19 3.69 3 17
An exciting life 11.45 4.15 1 18
A world at peace 11.52 5.35 1 18
Social recognition 12.86 3.72 3 18
A world of beauty 14.16 3.12 7 18
National security 15.20 2.69 8 18
While the individual school results and the total sample are very
interesting, the size of the pool does restrict what broad principles can
be deduced from the data. These rankings reflect the priorities of 69
law students. However, presently there are 179 ABA approved law
schools with a combined student population of approximately
128,000.114 The results of the pilot study cannot be used to attribute
value hierarchies to all schools. Even if the universe of students was
restricted to clinical students, the sample is still not large enough. Yet,
even if one considers the 69 individual responses alone, interesting
questions for future research are raised. The low salvation ranking by
the two California schools and the New York school seems notewor-
thy. Does it reflect a more liberal school population or do these three
schools have unusually liberal students? Would rankings in the Mid-
west be similar to those in the South? And, are those students really
114. See generally THE OFFICIAL GUIDE TO U.S. LAW ScHoOLs (1998).
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TABLE VII
RANKING OF VALUES FOR EUROPEAN-
AMER./WHITE UF STUDENTS
Value Mean Std Dev Highest Lowest
Self-respect 5.52 4.00 1 15
Happiness 5.54 3.72 1 14
True friendship 5.92 2.98 1 13
Freedom 6.08 4.74 1 18
Mature love 6.28 3.85 2 18
Family security 6.92 4.33 1 17
Inner harmony 7.52 4.83 1 17
Wisdom 7.92 5.17 1 17
A sense of accomplishment 9.04 3.99 3 18
Pleasure 10.21 3.60 3 16
A world at peace 10.88 5.80 1 18
A comfortable life 10.88 4.57 1 18
Equality 11.32 4.63 1 18
An exciting life 11.40 3.52 4 17
Social recognition 13.00 3.61 3 18
Salvation 14.04 5.76 1 18
A world of beauty 14.21 3.26 7 18
National security 14.60 2.81 8 18
liberal? The equality ranking at USD and BLS reflected a rather cen-
trist leaning. Would students at a historically black law school such as
Howard or North Carolina Central have value rankings similar to the
coastal schools or would their ranking more closely resemble those of
white southern students? Salvation ranked very highly for the black
UF students. How does that fit into the value structure of those who
endorse the Protestant Work Ethic? Is it inconsistent that black stu-
dents who values equality so highly could also strongly endorse a
value that was integral to the PWE? A greater number of black re-
spondents would be helpful in understanding differences in value hier-
archies and their potential relation to anti-poor or anti-black attitudes.
The second goal of the pilot study was to determine whether a
link could be found between a student's value system and her percep-
tions of zealousness. Survey 3 contained the six descriptions of law-
yer-client interaction. The following scenario is an example of what
the students were given:
Lawyer Davis has a client who lives in a town far outside of the city
where the Legal Services office is located. Davis has some papers
the client needs to review and sign so that they can be filed in court
before a hearing scheduled for the end of the week. Davis asks the
client to come into the office to review the papers. Client tells Da-
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TABLE VIII
RANKING OF VALUES FOR UF STUDENTS
OF COLOR
Value Mean Std Dev Highest Lowest
Salvation 3.30 5.17 1 17
Self-respect 4.70 3.27 1 13
Family security 5.80 2.94 1 10
Freedom 6.20 4.44 2 14
Equality 6.70 3.89 3 13
Mature love 6.70 3.13 2 12
Happiness 6.80 4.34 1 12
Wisdom 6.90 2.77 2 11
True friendship 8.00 3.37 3 13
Inner harmony 8.80 3.77 3 16
A world at peace 10.00 4.81 2 16
A comfortable life 11.45 4.61 4 18
A sense of accomplishment 11.60 4.06 5 17
Pleasure 13.60 2.55 9 17
An exciting life 14.10 3.48 8 18
Social recognition 14.50 2.37 10 17
A world of beauty 14.50 3.14 8 18
National security 16.70 1.95 13 18
vis he does not have the bus fare to come into the city twice in one
week. Davis insists that the client come into the office.
The students were then required to select a description of the
lawyer's action. Five descriptions were available:
Lawyer went beyond what was needed for zealous advocacy.
Lawyer represented client zealously.
Lawyer represented client better than adequately but not
zealously.
Lawyer represented client adequately.
Lawyer did not represent client adequately.
Each scenario was assigned a "correct" answer based on a com-
parison of the lawyer's described behavior and my own conception of
zealous representation. In the scenario described above the correct
answer was the last option: the lawyer did not represent the client
adequately. The rationale is that when representing a poor client, a
lawyer must take the client's circumstances into consideration when
scheduling the time and location of appointments. If the papers had
to be signed, the lawyer should have sought out an alternative method
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to get the papers to the client."' I had predicted that students whose
value rankings predicted anti-poor attitudes would select representa-
tion that was only adequate or even less than adequate as zealous rep-
resentation. This would be consistent with a belief that poor people
are only entitled to minimal representation. However, as I discussed
the language of the scenarios with colleagues I arrived at the conclu-
sion that some of the hypotheticals constructed to test zealous repre-
sentation were too complicated and raised ambiguities. In those cases
it was possible to select an answer, which zealously protected the cli-
ent's interests but, at the same time, was different from the answer
that I had deemed correct.
It is not at all surprising that my choice of zealousness would
complicate matters. The word itself, at least in legal parlance, is am-
biguous. The ABA requires all lawyers to act zealously, but has never
defined exactly what zealous means.1 16 It is sometimes used to mean
competent or minimally competent.117 In the my view the two are not
the same.11 8 Zealousness implies something significant beyond "mini-
mally competent." While definition of the word eludes even me, per-
haps it would be possible to identify factors that lawyers believe would
be included within the framework of zealousness. For example, in a
litigation context, it could be agreed that "zealous representation"
would require that the lawyer at least understand the way that poverty
impacts a litigant's ability to participate in the process. Or perhaps,
115. Other scenarios were more complicated:
Lawyer Brown represents a black woman who has been accused by her former em-
ployer of stealing company property. Client was acquitted of the charges at trial. The
company has now filed a civil action against the client for the value of the missing
property. Brown counterclaims against her employer for malicious prosecution. After
discovery and pretrial hearings have taken place, the employer dismissed its action
against client. Client wants to go forward with the counterclaim even though Brown
advised her that she has slightly less than a 50% chance of prevailing at trial. The
client, who has been unable to get a job since she was fired, feels strongly about pursu-
ing the claim. She believes the employer has harassed her, and she must go forward to
restore her dignity. Brown tells client it is pointless to go to trial on "principle," and
that it would be a waste of time and money for everyone. Brown impresses upon client
that the office is a Legal Services office, and has to serve many deserving clients.
Brown strongly suggests client drop the counterclaim.
As before, the correct answer is that the lawyer did not represent the client zealously. Dignity
interests of a client are a perfectly permissible basis for hired attorneys to go to trial; belittling a
client's interest and asserting that going to trial was "pointless" was clearly not zealous
representation.
116. See Jacobs, Legal, supra note 3, at 98 (noting that the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility does not provide a definition of zealousness).
117. See id. at 102 (noting that a similar process occurred with the definition of "effective
assistance of counsel").
118. See id. at 103 (arguing that the bar expects only adequate, but not zealous,
representation).
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commitment to full representation in the face of an uncooperative cli-
ent could be viewed as a factor of zealousness. Before drawing defini-
tive conclusions on the connections between values and zealousness,
Survey 3 should be revised to eliminate as many ambiguities as possi-
ble and think further about whether factors common to the represen-
tation of poor people could be identified as zealous traits.
This pilot study demonstrates that the Rokeach Value Survey
could be given in the law school context and that other instruments
developed and used in association with the Survey have the potential
to tell us much about how our students and potentially how actual
lawyers approach the task of representing the poor.
IV. LAWYERING AND VIEWS OF THE POOR
A. The Bar's Complicity in Devaluing Poor Clients
The pilot study suggests that law students' attitudes toward the
poor can affect the level of representation provided for indigent cli-
ents. But will their values and attitudes be moderated by the influ-
ence of the licensed bar? There are no studies that focus exclusively
on lawyers' attitudes and beliefs toward poor clients. The bar's histor-
ical relationship with the poor, however, sheds some light on lawyers'
attitudes toward the indigent. Despite steadfast support by bar lead-
ers for protection of poor people's right to full access to justice, the
support of the majority of individual lawyers is, and has been, elusive.
The private bar has generally viewed lawyers who work on behalf of
the poor with displeasure. Private lawyers argued against expansion
of the services for the poor, stating that Legal Aid organizations
would take away their bread and butter clients.1 9 Opposition to the
formation of Legal Services from the organized bar was initially for-
midable.12 Even today, an echo of the antagonism towards legal
work performed on behalf of the poor is reflected in public comments
and law review articles that oppose mandatory pro bono.121 The bar,
of course, has made numerous efforts to secure the rights of poor peo-
ple. The hostility to poor people can most vividly be seen through
lawyers' reactions to these efforts.
119. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA 55 (1976).
120. See id. at 42.
121. See David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735
(1980). See generally Roger Cramton, Mandatory Pro Bono, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1113 (1991).
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The first efforts to establish a reliable source of legal representa-
tion for the indigent in this country began in 1876 in New York
City.122 Initially this project was the brainchild of a group of German
American lawyers. They established a committee, the Deutscher
Rechts-Schuts Verein, to help newly arrived German immigrants.'23
The lawyers assisting the new immigrants helped with legal matters:
primarily laborer's claims against unscrupulous employers. They also
represented the new immigrants in actions brought by unscrupulous
merchants who tried to take advantage of the immigrants' naivete and
inability to speak English. The lawyers also participated in group
teaching sessions and distributed mass literature to provide as much
information to the immigrants as possible." 4 This included not only
legal information, but also educational access and language training to
help their newly arrived German compatriots' economic develop-
ment. 2 5 Developing the knowledge and skills of the immigrants
would hasten their ability to assimilate into established society
thereby removing them from the stigma of being part of the poor.' 26
The motivation of the German lawyers was not altogether altruistic.
They understood that the fate of their newly arrived countrymen
would affect the fate of those already established. If the newly arrived
fared poorly, their status would drag down the status of all Germans,
including those who were lawyers.127 Therefore, it was in the best in-
terests of the entire German community to ensure that the immigrants
succeeded in making the transition into American society. They knew
it was impossible to separate the legal rights of an individual from his
general living conditions.
The "anglicized offspring" of the German committee became
known as the New York Legal Aid Society.'12  Its objectives were
somewhat narrower than the committee's. The Society was to "render
Legal Aid and assistance ... gratuitously, to those of German birth,
who may appear worthy thereof, but who from poverty are unable to
122. See Alan W. Houseman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor - A Commentary,
83 GEO. L.J. 1669 (1995) (describing the origins of the formation of the Legal Aid Society of
New York): see also JOEL HANDLER, ET AL., LAWYERS AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS 17-
24 (1978) [hereinafter LAWYERS].
123. AUERBACH, supra note 119, at 53.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See Houseman, supra note 122, at 1670.
128. See Auerbach, supra note 119, at 53.
[VOL. 44:257
Full Legal Representation
procure it."' 29 Shortly after the New York Legal Aid Society was
formed, similar efforts were undertaken in other areas of the country.
In Chicago, the Protective Agency for Women and Children was
formed in 1886 and the Bureau of Justice was formed in 1888.130 The
two organizations merged to form what became known as the Chicago
Legal Aid. It mainly represented individuals in individual cases.
There was no overriding purpose of attempting to lift those served out
of poverty.' Chicago Legal Aid relied upon the organized bar and
the charity of individuals for any funds it received. There was no rec-
ognition of entitlement to legal assistance, other than the lofty and
aspirational belief that the law was for every man.1 32 In several other
areas of the country, bar leaders adopted the blue print of Chicago
Legal Aid and of some portions of the New York Legal Aid Society.
By 1917, there were thirty-seven cities with forty-one different Legal
Aid organizations. 33 With the advent of World War I, anti-German
sentiment within the country was whipped into a fervor and forced the
German American lawyers to give up control of the New York Legal
Aid Society."3 The society's management was transferred into the
hands of a new board of lawyers. The new board changed eligibility
standards so that all people were eligible to be represented and
steered its activities towards individual representation and away from
the secondary education function.
The form of organization and the management of the Legal Aid
offices differed but they all had two things in common. First, re-
129. Id.
130. See MCINTYRE, supra note 8, at 31 n.1 (noting that the Protective Agency "was formed
for the purpose of protecting young girls from seduction under the guise of proffered employ-
ment." The Bureau of Justice was sponsored by the Society for Ethical Culture and was "to
serve the non-criminal legal needs of the poor, regardless of nationality, race or sex." In 1905,
the two agencies joined to form the Chicago Legal Aid Society. McIntyre, in discussing the
differences between the public defender service and the Chicago Legal Aid Society, points out
that "Legal Aid was a charitable enterprise and its founders were careful to disassociate them-
selves from the 'unworthy poor').
131. See Caste, supra note 32, at 270 (pointing out that American Legal Aid societies were
dominated by business class lawyers and business executives. They were not open to an advo-
cacy role for legal assistance in promoting social change).
132. See REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 3 (1919):
Freedom and equality of justice are twin fundamental conceptions of American juris-
prudence .... A system which created class distinctions, having one law for the rich
and another for the poor, which was a respecter of persons, granting its protection to
one citizen and denying it to his fellow, we would unhesitatingly condemn as unjust, as
devoid of those essentials without which there can be no justice.
133. MacCrate, TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at 48.
134. See AUERBACH, supra note 119, at 54.
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sources were inadequate. 135 "Offices were usually so poorly funded
that they had to set very strict eligibility standards in order to keep
down the caseload limit."' 36 As a result, eligible clients were severely
under-represented. 37 They avoided community education or public-
ity so that their work schedules would remain tolerable. For many
Legal Aid clients, access to the legal system consisted of only one in-
terview with a Legal Aid lawyer. 38 In addition, early generations of
lawyers who supported the notion of Legal Aid, supported it only to
the extent that the "worthy" poor could receive Legal Aid.1 39 "The
'unworthy' poor - those without jobs - were disregarded; the chosen
'beneficiaries were not people who always [were] poor but only peo-
ple 'who are made poor for the time being by the wrongful acts of
others'." 4 '
For moralistic reasons, Legal Aid offices established guidelines
concerning the. types of cases they would accept.' 4 ' Family law cases
generally comprised a large percentage of the case load, though di-
vorces were rarely handled.'4 2 Among the cases that were frequently
declined were: adoptions, bankruptcies, civil mental commitment
hearings, juvenile proceedings, and administrative hearings.143 The
second most common category of cases was landlord-tenant, espe-
cially in major metropolitan areas. "Consumer problems were numer-
ous; they included installment purchases, repossession of
merchandise, and fraudulent sales.' ' 44
Essentially, clients were perceived and treated as recipients of
charity at the Legal Aid societies, like a welfare office. 145 Not only
did the Legal Aid societies restrict representation to those deemed
135. See Houseman, supra note 122, at 1671 (noting that as of 1919, of the six Legal Aid
offices where records were available, only one - Newark, New Jersey - had over ten percent of
the bar association supporting the local Legal Aid office).
136. LAWYERS, supra note 122, at 19.
137. Houseman, supra note 122, at 1671 (stating that "it was estimated that the legal aid
organizations reached less than 1% of those needing representation").
138. See Lawyers, supra note 122, at 19-20.
139. See AUERBACH, supra note 119, at 56.
140. id.
141. LAWYERS, supra note 122, at 19; see also Allen Redlich, Who Will Litigate Constitutional
Issues for the Poor, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 745, 750 n.30 (1992) (stating that community
mores and the mores of the contributors dictated both the types of cases handled and the atti-
tude of the lawyers).
142. See LAWYERS, supra note 122, at 19 (stating that divorces were considered a "luxury,"
and therefore not to be offered to the poor); see also Houseman, supra note 122, at 1671.
143. See LAWYERS, supra note 122, at 19.
144. Id.
145. See Redlich, supra note 141, at 750 n.30.
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worthy, but fear of offending the organized bar led them to restrict the
types of cases handled for the worthy poor. Even if a worthy poor
person came to them with a viable legal claim, the society could reject
the client if it felt the claim was too large.146 Thus, the interests of
indigent clients never superseded the interest of unconnected mem-
bers of the organized bar. Legal Aid emphasized service to individu-
als exclusively. Emphasis on individual services stemmed from the
assumption that the law was the same for everyone. The problems the
poor had were merely ones of access. Logically, "the more lawyers
who made time available to the poor (on an individual, one-on-one
basis), the more likely it was that the legal system would operate
fairly." '147 There was no law reform or class action litigation; only
minimal effort was made to uncover the problems of the poor and
sensitize society to legal needs.
Thirty-five years after the establishment of the first Legal Aid of-
fices, Reginald Heber Smith in his landmark book, JUSTICE AND THE
POOR, remarked on the failure of the legal profession to help provide
access to justice for the poor. t4 8 Inspired by a 1906 Roscoe Pound
speech to the American Bar Association that criticized the bar's re-
sponse to providing legal services to the poor, Smith undertook a
study of the problem of providing access. He concluded:
The administration of American justice is not impartial, the rich and
the poor do not stand on an equality before the law, the traditional
method of providing justice has operated to close the doors of the
court to the poor, and has caused a gross denial of justice in all parts
of the country to millions of persons.
149
Smith pointed out that the majority of American lawyers viewed
the situation of the poor with indifference.15 0 Smith believed the dif-
ference in access was not the fault of the law itself, which he believed
to be "eminently fair and impartial,"1'' but rather to defects in the
146. See AUERBACH, supra note 119, at 56-57.
147. LAWYERS, supra note 122, at 19; see also Houseman, supra note 122, at 1671 (stating that
the needs of the poor were irrelevant to the legal aid societies, the societies' goal was to provide
service to clients, it just happened to be that those clients were poor).
148. See generally SMITH, supra note 132.
149. Id. at 8 (quoting comment from a lawyer: "it is the harsh fact that, with all out prating
about justice, we deliberately withhold it from the thousands who are too poor to pay for it").
150. See id. at 9.
151. Id. at 14-15 (noting that the belief in the fairness and impartiality of the law is one of the
most persistent and amazing myths of the American legal jurisprudence. It is a belief cherished
by the majority of American lawyers, despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary). See
LEON A. HIGGENBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR (1978) (describing the conscious effort by
lawmakers to insure that the rights of Africans and their American born children were denied
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administration of justice.15 Still, after promising descriptions of new
opportunities, Smith points out the most significant problem the Legal
Aid societies had was a lack of funding.'5 3 Smith recognized that the
Legal Aid work was entirely dependent upon periodic appeals to the
public and the bar - which had been wholly unsuccessful, given the
importance of the work done by the agencies. He identified two rea-
sons: inability of the boards to raise money 54 and the disfavored na-
ture of the work in comparison to that of other charities. The Legal
Aid societies had to deal with the perception that their clients were
wrecks and failures of civilization.155 Smith described the Legal Aid
recipients as "self-respecting, self-supporting persons .... [T]hey re-
present the common people." '5 6 Therefore, it was clear that by the
time of Smith's work, the concept of client unworthiness was firmly
entrenched in the legal profession's thinking.
The bar had indeed established a tradition of charitable legal
work for the poor, but, though the tradition was supported by the
elites of the profession, it remained in the backwaters of professional
interest.157 These legal rights efforts were paternalistic, moralistic,
and limited in the services they delivered. They conceived their role
as handling problems thrust upon them rather than seeking ways to
assist the poor in finding long-term solutions to the problems pro-
duced by poverty.
As the Legal Aid Societies entered into the 1960s, they were still
struggling with inadequate funding and a lack of universal support
among the bar and the legislature. On the political front, President
Johnson had initiated the War on Poverty, which led to the establish-
through legal processes); see also Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color Blind",
44 STAN. L. RFv. 1 (1991).
152. See SMiTH, supra note 132, at 15 (identifying three defects: delay, court costs and fees,
and expense of counsel. He also explores the development of agencies and approaches, which
could help alleviate the problems of administration. Id. at 37. Small claims courts, conciliation
(which we would today call mediation), arbitration, administrative courts, administrative of-
ficers, and domestic courts were mentioned as possible solutions. Id. at 38-39).
153. See id. at 193 (noting that the lack of funds was seen as causing depression among work-
ers and preventing the agencies from accepting the great opportunities which awaited).
154. See id. at 195-96 (stating that the author believed the board of directors or the executive
committees of the various Legal Aid offices were "sadly lacking in imagination and enterprise,"
and thus "failed to arouse the interest in legal aid work").
155. See id. at 196.
156. See id.
157. See LAWYERS, supra note 122, at 21; Tigran W. Eldred & Thomas Schoenherr, The Law-
yer's Duty of Public Service: More Than a Charity, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 367 (1993-94) (describing
the bar's ambiguity over whether service is just charity or whether it is a duty).
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ment of the Office of Economic Opportunity. 158 At the same time, a
new critique of the failure of the profession to provide legal services
to the poor was raised.' 5 9 Challenges were made to the nature of the
Legal Aid's focus on individual service on a "first come, first serve"
basis.160 Lawyers interested in helping the poor encouraged the bar
and the government to take a new approach to resolving the dilemma
of insufficient access to the law.16 ' These new lawyers believed that
systematic and institutional change was needed.1 62 Lawyers also rec-
ognized that they needed to help poor people become empowered so
that they could begin to take care of their own problems, rather than
remaining dependent on handouts for protection of their rights.1 63
Lawyers who wished to use the law as a tool of reform were successful
in influencing the OEO to incorporate the provision of Legal Services
to the poor into the agenda of the War Against Poverty.16 4
It was hoped that the new organizations would be the catalyst for
significant legal change for poor people. Each office was free to con-
struct the type of service it would provide to its constituent commu-
nity, as long as it followed the basic guidelines established by the
OEO. The Legal Services organizations distinguished themselves
from Legal Aid based on the elements they viewed as critical to effec-tive legal services.165 All programs had to include five basic elements:
(1) accountability to the client community; 66
158. See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (1964) (re-
pealed in part, 1981).
159. See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Jerome E.
Carlin & Jan Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 UCLA L. REV. 381 (1965);
Edgar S. Cahn & Jean C. Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317
(1964) [hereinafter Cahn, The War]; Edward V. Sparer, The Role of the Welfare Client's Lawyer,
12 UCLA L. REv. 361 (1965). For a more exhaustive listing of the articles in this area, see
Redlich, supra note 141, at 745 n.2.
160. See Edgar S. Cahn & Jean C. Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession? - The Public
Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005 (1970) [hereinafter Cahn, Power] (criticizing
Legal Aid for retaining an approach to lawyering that mimicked survival behavior among Third
World economies. The Cahns believed all of the resources of Legal Aid societies went into day-
to-day survival, which left none for planning and improvement of services).
161. See id. See generally Wexler, supra note 64.
162. See Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner's Reflections on Political Lawyering, 31
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 297, 230 (1996); Houseman, supra note 122, at 1672.
163. See Cahn, Power, supra note 160, at 1012; Wexler, supra note 64, at 1055.
164. See Ruth Buchanan, Context, Continuity, and Differences in Poverty Law Scholarship,
48 U. MIAMi L. REv. 999 (1994); Houseman, supra note 122, at 1673 (crediting the Cahns and
Bellow with influencing Clint Bamberger to include Legal Services within OEO and to fight for
its funding).
165. See Houseman, supra note 122, at 1684.
166. See id. (noting that most Legal Services offices formed to serve communities as a whole
as opposed to just indigent individuals).
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(2) right of clients to participate in board decision making; 167
(3) pursuit of law reform to address historic inadequacies;' 6
(4) response to legal need rather than demand; 1 69 and
(5) provision of a full range of service and advocacy tools.'7 °
When the Legal Services organizations were authorized there
were no mandatory qualification guidelines and offices were author-
ized to represent community groups as well as individuals.
The Legal Services programs were responsible for almost all of
the procedural due process rights established for welfare recipients. 7 '
They established due process rights for public housing residents. 72
Many of the protections against creditors that all consumers now en-
joy were won through the efforts of Legal Services attorneys. 73 Pro-
cedural due process rights for the mentally ill, 74 landlord tenant
protections, and other consumer rights were established by Legal Ser-
vices lawyers.' 75
The birth and initial successes of Legal Services exacted a high
price. At its birth, the concept of Legal Services was attacked by the
bar itself and by the Legal Aid Societies. 76 Arguments were made
that Legal Services would take work away from lawyers in private
167. See id. (explaining that the new lawyers recognized the right of clients to control deci-
sion-making that affected them. Client representation on local boards was advocated to give
clients a voice in decisions, which affected selection of case, matters, and allocation of
resources).
168. See id. (noting that it was the intention of the lawyers to use law reform as the tool to
achieve significant systematic changes to policies that adversely impacted the poor).
169. See id. (stating that in this way the new lawyers attempted to address the Legal Aid
practice of representing whomever came in the door on a first come-first serve basis. The Legal
Services programs wanted to commit resources to identifying critical needs of the client commu-
nity as a whole, and finding solutions to those problems, rather than limiting themselves to solv-
ing individual problems).
170. See id. at 1685 (noting that the Legal Services programs offered litigation, including
appeals and representation before agencies. They also engaged in legislative advocacy and rule
drafting).
171. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare case).
172. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
173. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
174. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (upholding due process rights of per-
sons improperly committed to state mental institutions).
175. See the history of the Magnusson Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (noting that
California was the first state to seek protection of consumers who purchased new cars which
were plagued with defects. Eventually, all fifty states adopted bills providing consumers with
warranty protection. These laws came to be known as "lemon laws." The California case was
filed by a Legal Services lawyer).
176. See Houseman, supra note 122, at 1682 (noting that the Legal Aid Societies opposed the
formation of Legal Services because of the risks of lost funding, public perceptions that LAS
representations were ineffective, and greater federal involvement).
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practice and that the existence of a governing body would remove the
independence of the lawyers.177 Fortunately, the early attacks
withered or were successfully defeated by maneuvering around the
opposition. As Legal Services became more effective in compelling
the federal government to comply with its own laws, the organizations
began to irritate elected officials and members of the bar.178 President
Reagan did everything within his power to limit and destroy the ongo-
ing ability of Legal Services organizations to represent poor people." 9
Congressional limitations on the type of work Legal Services organi-
zations could perform, the client populations they could represent,
and the money they received were constantly under attack during the
twelve-year period of the Reagan and Bush administrations. 8
Though the overt attack ended when Clinton was elected, attempts to
restrict Legal Services' sphere of operation continue to this very
day. 1' While the leadership of the American Bar Association has vig-
orously defended funding of the Legal Services Corporation, individ-
ual lawyers have not stepped up to help absorb the numbers of clients
left without counsel as a result of government funding cutbacks.
Many local "Legal Services" offices continue to do valuable and
substantial work for their client populations despite the restrictions
imposed upon them. Other offices closed or reduced services; many
fell short of the original five elements and failed to sustain the prom-
ise of the early Legal Services founders.18 2 Some offices have been
177. See id. (recalling that the irony of the Legal Aid Society objections at first glance seem
surreal. But when viewed in the context that they were primarily engaged in individual repre-
sentation, that did not disturb the status quo).
178. See id. at 1687 (noting that as early as 1967, senators were trying to ban suits against the
government and governors vetoed controversial programs).
179. See Buchanan, supra note 164, at 1016 n.60. (stating that Reagan's battle against Legal
Services is well known and documented. Beginning in 1981 and continuing throughout his term,
he appointed board members who were in favor of dismantling the Legal Services Corporation).
180. See The Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2000)). During this period of time, numerous restrictions
were placed on the nature of representation that Legal Services offices were permitted to under-
take. They were forbidden from representing aliens and barred from cases challenging access to
abortion for poor women. Mandatory qualification guidelines were established, setting qualifi-
cation requirements below the poverty line; such that now, only the truly destitute can qualify
for services, leaving the rest of the poor with no alternatives for legal access.
181. See Constitutional Law - Congress Imposes New Restrictions on Use of Funds by Legal
Services Corporation - Omnibus Consolidated Recissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1346, 1347 n.8 (1997) (raising questions of
whether new restrictions imposed restraints upon Legal Services that violated the clients' consti-
tutional rights).
182. See Houseman, supra note 122, at 1696-99 (noting that some Legal Services offices did
adhere to the original goals of the program, and that comparisons across programs are difficult
to make. However, because of a combination of factors, LSC agencies have failed to involve the
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criticized from within for failure to provide a meaningful voice to the
client community on allocation of resources. 183 Legal Services has
been subjected to the criticism that it too, is prone to race, class and
sex discrimination, both in its hiring and in its treatment of clients.184
Many programs are now indistinguishable from those that were criti-
cized 30 years ago in that there is no overriding commitment to help
better the condition of the poor through providing access to the law
and legal institutions." 5 Disdain for clients and the kind of legal assis-
tance they require has crept into the thinking and planning of local
offices.186
Eighty years after the publication of JUSTICE AND THE POOR, the
Legal Services organizations matched the description of the Legal Aid
Societies: under-funded, underpaid, living from year to year, not
knowing whether their organizations would exist through the next leg-
islative session. 187
Legal Services offered the hope of a new order that was based on
the concept that the indigent client population had value and that it
was important to rework legal institutions so that the concerns of the
indigent were recognized and valued in those institutions. Its bright
client populations significantly in decision-making, and have failed to establish goals and priori-
ties coherently and, above all, have not remained flexible to creative solutions to help relieve
conditions of poverty).
183. See Edgar S. Cahn, Reinventing Poverty Law, 103 YALE L.J. 2133 (1994) [hereinafter
Cahn, Reinventing].
184. See Paul E. Lee & Mary M. Lee, Reflections From the Bottom of the Well: Racial Bias in
the Provision of Legal Services to the Poor, CLEARING HOUSE REV., Special Issue, 311-321
(1993) [hereinafter Lee & Lee].
185. We even see a return to questions of moral worthiness. Divorce work, for example, is
generally frowned upon by Legal Services. It is frequently seen as less important than other
legal needs. Lawyers resent having to do the work; they view it as routine. See Elizabeth Mc-
Culloch, Let Me Show You How: Pro Se Divorce Courses and Client Power, 48 FLA. L. REv. 481
(1997) (commenting on the willingness of lawyers to develop pro se divorce courses to en-
courage women to represent themselves in some divorces).
186. See id, (describing Legal Services lawyers' resistance to performing matrimonial work
for poor women as being unimportant, routine matters. Id. at 498. Professor Mary Zulack, a
former Legal Aid lawyer, added that the imposition of rigid financial qualification guidelines
injected an air of suspicion into the dynamic between lawyer and client, as offices studied each
client's eligibility claim in order to determine whether they were "cheating" and trying to obtain
services they did not deserve. Telephone interview with Mary Zulack, (June 8, 1997)).
187. See AuERBACH, supra note 119, at 116 (stating that xenophobic Americanism of World
War 11 led the bar to dismiss the implication of Smith's findings). The aggressive assault on LSC
funding was successfully blocked after the 1995 legislative session. By then, Legal Services had
lost 30% of its budget. While there are no longer vocal calls to eliminate LSC, the lost money
has not been restored. Legal Services, now, more than ever, must rely on partnerships and the
good will of the private bar to survive. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, Legal Services and the Organ-
ized Bar: A Reminiscence and a Renewed Call for Cooperation, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 305
(1998).
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vision is at risk of being extinguished. Why is this so? Poor people
still need access to the law. Legal Services, particularly in its heyday,
made substantial strides towards achieving concrete goals. Yet, the
dismantling continues. The drive towards dismantling, I believe, is
driven by deeply held views that the client populations do not deserve
access to the full range of legal tools and services.
B. The Worthiness of Lawyers Representing the Poor
If public sentiment towards the poor affects decision-making, can
it also affect the perceived value of the lawyer representing the poor?
As a result, might the lawyer representing the poor feel less profes-
sional? If so, will that impact on the lawyer's ability to give the poor
client full representation? These are difficult questions. There is
some scholarship on the alleged low morale among lawyers who work
on behalf of the poor. For example, it is argued that the turnover rate
in Legal Services and public defender offices is high."8 Caseloads are
extremely high which leaves staff attorneys little time to do research,
investigate facts, or litigate." 9 In part, the Legal Services Corporation
is responsible for the state of poverty practice. The Corporation has
been accused of caring little about quality of representation, choosing
to focus more on having high volumes of cases and clients. 190 In fact,
it has been argued that lawyers who represent the poor routinely pro-
vide superficial and inadequate representation.' 91
Even the most ardent supporters of poverty lawyers admit that
lawyers may now be suffering from indifference to clients and the
need for social justice.'92 That indifference is the product of a combi-
nation of factors. Certainly the slashing of funding for programs deal-
ing with the poor and the attendant loss of jobs and job opportunities
caused by reduced funding makes it difficult to motivate young law-
188. See Redlich, supra note 141, at 749-50.
189. See id. at 750.
190. See id. at 749.
191. See Mark Feldman, Political Lesson: Legal Services for the Poor, 83 GEO. L.J. 1529,
1534-38 (1995). But see Gary Bellow & Jeanne Charn, Paths Not Yet Taken: Some Comments on
Feldman's Critique of Legal Services Practice, 83 GEO. L.J. 1633 (1995) (questioning the data
Feldman used to support his conclusion, stating that there was no agreement within supervisory
level attorneys that staff attorneys provide inadequate representation); Rodney Uphoff, The
Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systematic Approach, 2 CLIN. L. REV. 73, 80
(1995) (contesting similar claims made against public defenders).
192. See Bellow, supra note 162, at 304 (stating that paternalism is not the main problem for
today's lawyers. The main problems are indifference, distance, drift, and visionlessness).
2001]
Howard Law Journal
yers to enter the field or, once having entered, to remain. 93 The
structure of Legal Services organizations plays a factor. Offices are
either too small to enable lawyers to take on complex cases, or spe-
cialized units that have been established to handle "big" cases have
siphoned off talented local attorneys. 194
Many lawyers share the belief that legal representatives of the
poor are "low" status lawyers who perform that kind of work because
they cannot get other jobs.'95 When interacting with poverty lawyers
as adversaries, private lawyers often show annoyance when Legal Ser-
vices lawyers or public defenders represent their clients zealously and
aggressively. 196 Even public interest lawyers themselves frequently
think of themselves as low status. Lawyers who do what looks to be
more traditional "lawyer type" work, i.e. performing legal research on
complicated issues, writing briefs and arguing motions on substantive
point of law are considered to have higher status.
In the surveys of Legal Services lawyers conducted by Handler to
measure turn over in the Legal Services area, one of the areas the
survey examined was lawyer satisfaction. 197 Legal Services lawyers
who handled individual case representation reported less job satisfac-
tion than did lawyers working in public interest law firms or those
lawyers in Legal Services whose work was primarily law reform ori-
ented.1 98 Both in criminal and civil fields, lawyers who work on behalf
of the poor acknowledge that they are troubled by the lack of respect
they receive from judges, adversaries, and clients.1 99
After struggling through three years of law school, it would be
easy to see how a young lawyer, who does not fully understand the
193. See generally id. See also Louise B. Trubeck, Embedded Practices: Lawyers, Clients, and
Social Change, 31 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 415, 417 (1996).
194. See Redlich, supra note 141, at 775 (noting that this practice leaves remaining staff at-
torneys feeling confined to low level work, and because a unit exists to handle big cases, the staff
attorneys cease to look for the legal issues that generate the big cases).
195. See MCINTYRE, supra note 8, at 64 (explaining that many of the lawyers who represent
the poor do have other employment opportunities, but have chosen the field of poverty law. By
the same token, there are more poverty lawyers who are women and people of color - groups
who are not reflected in large numbers in corporate firms); see also Kennedy, supra note 85, at
51-52 (stating that in law school, students are channeled into a hierarchy that dismisses practices
alternative to corporate practice as suspect).
196. See Comments from Andrea Williams and Siobhan McGowan, both from Bergen
County Legal Services (stating that so long as they are just settling or pleading, their work is
acceptable. Should they attempt to get discovery or file motions, lawyers complain that the
Legal Services lawyers are costing hard working, law-abiding people more money).
197. See LAWYERS, supra note 122, at 63.
198. See id. at 63-64, 83.
199. See id. at 87.
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complexities of the practice, might tire of work on behalf of the poor
when that work appears "routine." And while the work does not nec-
essarily have to be routine, Legal Services lawyers face expectations
that the work will be routine because the social status of their clients is
believed to be insignificant.
2 0 0
Worse still, lawyers who represent the poor encounter disrespect
from the bench. In a survey of public defenders in Chicago, the big-
gest surprise the lawyers encountered was the lack of respect given to
them from judges.21  Although they felt that everyone treated them
with a lack of respect, they found it difficult to accept that judges
often treated them as second-class lawyers.202 Judges will often criti-
cize public defenders and Legal Services lawyers for asking for ad-
journments. In many courts, these lawyers are viewed as attempting
to sabotage the swift administration of justice, yet rarely are prosecu-
tors taken to task for not providing the discovery, which prompts the
delay in the first place. It is common to hear judges disparage Legal
Services and public defenders in open court.20 3 Even seasoned law-
yers find it difficult to work under such denigrating circumstances. A
new lawyer who is not yet certain of her own abilities may view the
judicial reflection of disdain as validation of the belief that her clients
and she, as their representative, are not worthy of the law's respect.
Attitudes within the bar towards the poor and the lawyers who
represent them are complex. Client dissatisfaction with Legal Ser-
vices lawyers or public defenders is reflected in the oft-repeated
phrase, "I want a real lawyer." Some clients have a good reason not
to value the services of their lawyers,2 but sometimes the dissatisfac-
tion is totally unwarranted and fueled by the myth of incompetence
which follows poverty lawyers.20 5 The myth of incompetence paints
200. See Jack Katz, Lawyers For The Poor In Transition: Involvement, Reform, and the Turn-
over Problems in the Legal Services Program, 12 LAW & Soc'y 275, 284 (1978) (discussing the
internal and external pressure toward routine handling of Legal Services casework).
201. See MCINTYRE, supra note 8, at 87.
202. See id. at 88 (noting that public defenders complained that judges took private lawyers'
eases first, so they could get back to their offices to make money, inferring that the public de-
fenders' time was not as valuable. Some judges sent them to run errands and treated them like
gophers).
203. See Wexler, supra note 64, at 1052 (stating that "judges often scoff at poverty lawyers,
calling their arguments 'garbage' and 'nonsense"').
204. See Uphoff, supra note 191, at 80; see also Jacobs, Legal, supra note 3, at 99-102.
205. Cf Uphoff, supra note 191, at 78-80; see Wexler, supra note 64, at 1052 (stating that
there are legitimate differences "in income, education, frustrations, and anger about failures as
well as a host of cultural and psychological differences that tend to divide rather than unite poor
people and their lawyers," and which fuel the myth of incompetence and create dissatisfaction);
see also MCINTYRE, supra note 8, at 89 (stating that the public's perception of public defender
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the poverty lawyer as an unfeeling, perfunctory machine of the state
whose major obligation is to process great numbers of cases without
performing any real legal service.2"6 The myth presumes that poverty
lawyers are generally unsuccessful in their efforts to obtain a result
that is good for the client because they are incompetent.20 7 In reality,
the success rate of poverty lawyers is comparable with that of the pri-
vate bar.20 8 The myth is partially sustained because poverty lawyers
are between the proverbial "rock and a hard place." If their successes
become too well known, as happened with Legal Services, the organi-
zations become the object of political attack.20 9 Yet, the failure to ad-
vertise success makes fundraising among sympathetic audiences more
difficult and allows the myth of incompetence to flourish unchal-
lenged. Finally, clients reflect values and judgments about poor peo-
ple themselves. If society does not hold impoverished people in high
esteem, it will be difficult for the impoverished client to hold the rep-
resentative of that population in esteem, even if she is a member of
that clientele. 10
V. TRANSFORMING OUR VISION OF CLIENTS
FROM "THEM" TO "US"
Lawyers and law students are not immune from preoccupations
with seeing poor clients as "them" versus "us." As long as poor peo-
ple are "them,"' 21' or "those people, '212 they will remain outsiders,
objects of pity, scorn, or study, but never as full citizens and members
of the larger community.213 As long as poor people remain "them,"
there is no incentive to help better the conditions that produce pov-
erty. Indeed, it is often politically expedient for the ruling class to
incompetence is most often expressed when the client says, "I don't want a P.D., I want a real
lawyer"). Despite this fact, studies show clients of pubic defenders do just as well as those of
assigned or private lawyers. See Uphoff, supra note 191, at 77-78.
206. See Johnathan D. Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I Had
a Public Defender, 1 YALE REV. L. & Soc. AcTION 4 (1971).
207. See MCINTYRE, supra note 8, at 62-64; Uphoff, supra note 191, at 77-78.
208. See MclrervrE, supra note 8, at 64.
209. See id. at 65-72 (stating that public defenders are particularly vulnerable. Advertising
successes will give the public the impression that criminals are being allowed to walk the streets,
as opposed to believing that innocent citizens have been vindicated in the courts).
210. See volume 46:2 of the J. oF Soc. IssuEs (1990) (explaining the many ways expectancies
impact behavior).
211. KATZ, supra note 21, at 236.
212. Id. (quoting remarks of former Vice-President Dan Quayle).
213. See id.
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have a group that can be identified as the bottom rung of society.2 t 4
The less fortunate can successfully be used as a political scapegoat to
blame for higher taxes, high crime rates and general lack of economic
security. t5 The poor become the root of social problems as opposed
to social problems being seen as the root of poverty.
2 16
If we could transform how we think about poor people, it could
change the face of legal practice. If poor people could be seen as part
of "us" it would force us to adjust our thinking. Resolution of eco-
nomic deprivation of the poor would benefit everyone because it
would reduce the drain on the costs of social services to the poor and
the costs of securing everyone against crime committed by the poor.21 7
We should support educational spending because better education
would benefit all of us. Employers would have more knowledgeable
and skilled workers. More gainfully employed workers mean more
disposable income to pump into local economies. More incomes
mean better services and living conditions, which translate into safer
communities. The Germans who formed Legal Services understood
the benefit of making the new immigrants "us." Consequently, they
chose to offer more comprehensive assistance to the poor.2 18 Yet
most of us are afraid to be identified with the poor. We think we lose
something valuable when that happens. 21 9 At the same time, we enjoy
the protection of rights that were gained as a result of advocacy for
the poor.220 And poor people are "us." As the studies showed, poor
214. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Realism - After We're Gone: Prudent Speculations on
America-in a Post-Racial Epoch, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 393 (1990).
215. See Karst, supra note 58, at 523.
216. See, e.g., LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED 31-32 (1994).
217. See The True Costs of More Prisons, Letters to the Editor, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1996, at
A19; State Services Funds Are Linked: Measure 11 Robs Schools, Parks, PORILAND ORECiONIAN,
Jul. 29, 1996, at B6 (making a connection between rising prison costs and lack of funding for
education, state parks and other services); America Trading Books for Bars: Spiraling Prison
Costs May Doom State Colleges, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 2, 1997, at 5F.
218. See supra Section IV.A.
219. See W.E.B. Du BoIs, BLACK RFCONSTRIJCTION 700 (Kraus-Thomson Organization
Ltd., 1976) (1935); see also David E. Bernstein, Roots of the "Underclass": the Decline of Laissez-
Faire Jurisprudence and the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 85 (1993); Rob-
ert J. Cottrol, Law, Labor, and Liberal Ideology: Explorations on the History of a Two-Edged
Sword, 67 TUL. L. REv. 153 (1993); Michael Jordan, The NLRB Racial Discrimination Decisions,
1935-1964: The Empiric Process of Administration and the Inner Eye of Racism, 24 CONN. L.
REV. 55 (1991) (describing employers' use of race to help prevent black and white workers from
forming effective coalitions). Similar examples can be found between white and black women
throughout the history of the feminist movement. See PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I
ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA (1984).
220. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (upholding the due process rights of
natural fathers threatened with loss of custody of their children); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235 (1970) (limiting the amount of time an individual can be incarcerated for an involuntary
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people have the same range of values, beliefs, and aspirations as do
other members of society, sometimes to their own disadvantage.221
The reasons for the persistence with which we distinguish our-
selves from the poor has complex roots in our psychological make up
and in our political and legal theories of jurisprudence. At the most
basic level, human nature may be at the very root of the problem.
Social scientists ask whether there is a fundamental human need man-
dating that we view others as either allies or enemies.222 People who
are viewed as existing outside the boundaries of our own moral val-
ues, rules of fairness and sense of justice are excluded from our moral
community.223 They are viewed as non-entities or undesirables and
can therefore be harmed or exploited at will.22 4 Some psychologists
believe moral exclusion is latent in all people. 225  It is a product of
being raised under conditions that inhibit our ability to fully integrate
good and bad components of others and ourselves. 226 Deutsch de-
scribes a process in which the bad parts of self are projected onto
others with whom one is in conflict. He states that, through this pro-
cess, conflict is turned into a win/lose struggle in which the interest of
self and the interests of the other are seen as completely opposed.2 27
failure to pay a fine). How many people would think of the poor as "us" if they realized the law
that protects them against an unscrupulous merchant came about as the result of a poor person?
How many grandparents visiting grandchildren of a divorced child realize their right to visit was
won by a poor person? See Krieg v. Glassburn, 419 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). Though
many people disparage criminal defense lawyers who "coddle criminals" and keep "killers on the
street," as soon as the same upstanding citizen has a relative in trouble, they express shock and
outrage at the ability of the state to do even the simplest things. See Symposium: Responsibili-
ties of the Criminal Defense Attorney, First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the [Defense] Lawyers,
30 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1 (1996).
221. See supra Part II.B (noting that some poor people ranked high in PWE values, which
leads to extreme frustration and depression because their economic condition prevents them
from attaining what their value system tells them is the only thing by which to measure their own
worth); ROKEACH, supra note 45, at 68 (analyzing data that showed black people and white
people shared some important values, except in the area of equality).
222. See V.D. Volkan, The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental Approach,
POL. PSYCHOL., vol. 6, 219-47 (1985).
223. See Susan Opotow, The Editor's Page, 46 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 1 (1990) (introducing issues
of the journal devoted to the study of social justice issues in psychology).
224. See id.
225. See Morton Deutsch, Psychological Roots of Moral Exclusion, 46 J. OF Soc. IssuEs 21,
25 (1990).
226. See id. at 23 (decribing a process whereby people learn to reconcile both the good and
bad parts of themselves and others during childhood. When the process is disturbed, bad attrib-
utes of the self are projected onto others. Conditions, which may inhibit the integration process,
are superiority claims based on race, gender, culture, religion or origin, which justifies treating
others as having inferior moral status and lack of contact between members of the community
and those that they seek to exclude).
227. See id. at 24.
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The other becomes both an enemy who deserves to lose, as well as a
threat to the interest of oneself."2 8 When this split occurs, the other
side is seen outside of the one's moral community.2
29
The belief that others have different morals and values threatens
the in-group's belief in the goodness of their own identity and group,
and their comprehension of reality. ° There is a history of devaluing
specific groups, in this case the poor. History "pre-selects" them as
potential victims, who under certain conditions become likely objects
of scapegoating and identification as ideological enemies.231 Psychol-
ogist Ervin Staub states that these groups are excluded from the range
applicability of moral values.2 32 Moreover, he argues that the "fear of
being harmed by the group now defined as the enemy, even if their
power is minimal, and the moral outrage that results from derogating
them and coming to see them as evil, can be added motivation for
violence against them. 2
33
Psychologist Daniel Bar-Tal links the concept of delegitimization
of the excluded to moral exclusion. Delegitimization is the process by
which a group is categorized into "extremely negative social catego-
ries that are excluded from the realm of acceptable norms and ...
values. ' 234 Bar-Tal identifies five common means of delegitimizing
groups:
(1) dehumanization, which occurs when the group is character-
ized as different from the human race;2 35
(2) trait characterization- where groups are described as possess-
ing extremely negative traits that are unacceptable in a given
society, such as aggressors, idiots, or parasites;236
(3) out casting - categorizing members of a group as transgres-
sors of pivotal norms such that they should be excluded from
228. See id.
229. Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as splitting into "we" and "they." Id. This is the
same as the use in this article of the terminology "us" and "them."
230. See Ervin Staub, Moral Exclusion, Personal Goal Theory and Extreme Destructiveness,
46 J. OF Soc. IssUEs 47, 52 (1990).
231. See id. at 54.
232. See id.
233. Id. at 55.
234. Daniel Bar-Tal, Causes and Consequences of Delegitimization: Models of Conflict and
Ethnocentrism, 46 J. OF Soc. IssuEs 65, 65 (1990).
235. Id. at 65.
236. Id. at 66.
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society and/or institutionalized - e.g. murderers, thieves, psy-
chopaths or maniacs; 3'
(4) use of political labels describing the group as a political entity
that threatens the basic values of the given society, is a dan-
ger to the system, and is therefore totally unacceptable;238
(5) group comparisons - labeling with the name of a group that is
negatively perceived, such as vandals.
Bar-Tal believes each society has a cultural repertoire of groups that
serve as symbols of malice, evil or wickedness.239 Our society regu-
larly and openly engages in four of the five means of delegitimizing
poor people. They are assigned trait characterizations of being lazy,
poorly educated, or freeloaders. They are categorized as outcasts
whose behavior borders on criminal, and are seen to be without
morals. In the case of some poor who are homeless, they are associ-
ated with the mentally ill. Political labels for the poor abound. The
very public welfare debate in Congress over the threat single women
with children pose to our basic values is but the most recent example.
Group comparisons most frequently occur when we are talking about
the poor who come from somewhere else, such as when we refer to
illegal aliens.
The most extreme product of moral exclusion is genocidal activity
undertaken by the people who believe themselves to be morally sound
individuals.24 Moral exclusion, however, produces behavior across
the full spectrum of human possibilities.2"' "Different people have
moral communities that vary in their degree of inclusiveness. '24 2 In
our society the more extreme calls for violence against out-groups are
rarely heard.243 But, we do engage in moral exclusion, as is demon-
strated by the "tendency to see poverty as the fault of the poor, school
failure as the fault of the children whom school has failed or violence
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. The near extermination of Native Americans, slavery of Africans brought to the Ameri-
cas, lynching of African Americans, internment of Japanese Americans, the Holocaust, rape and
slaughter of Bosnian people, and the atrocities in Rwanda, are but a few examples of genocidal
acts committed. See Albert Bandura, Selective Activation and Disengagement of Moral Control,
46 J. OF Soc. IssuEs 27, 28 (1990).
241. See Deutsch, supra note 225, at 21 (illustrating the range of behaviors).
242. Faye J.. Crosby & Elizabeth Pearsall Lubin, Extending the Moral Community: Logical
and Psychological Dimensions, 46 J. OF Soc. ISSUES 163, 163 (1990).
243. The two exceptions to this that come to mind immediately are the encouragement of
violence by pro-life opponents to abortion and the increasing violent activity of members of
American militia, e.g. the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City.
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as the fault of the victim of a violent act."' 2 4 4 "At times a group in
power or a majority may seek to enhance their power and wealth by
partially or wholly excluding some group from the moral universe. "245
Staub states that exclusion makes discrimination in education, em-
ployment and the restriction of civil rights possible. 46 "In addition to
protecting material self-interest, exclusion serves to protect an ele-
vated self-concept, maintain one's existing view of reality, which justi-
fies a privileged status.
2 4 7
The struggle to understand the causes of human behavior also has
relevance in our understanding of the law. Law's involvement in con-
structing images of poverty should not be surprising as law is the tool
which the majority in power uses to protect its interests. Despite obvi-
ous inequities in the wealth and living conditions of the poor in our
society, the law has not reached a satisfactory resolution of how to
help resolve the imbalance. Because Anglo-American law is repre-
sented as being neutral and objective, the courts cannot acknowledge
disparity and use it as a basis to support a decision.2 48 The new style
of legal representation adopted by the Legal Services organizations of
the 1960s and 70s attempted to use the law to solve the problems of
the poor through the redistribution of wealth and power.2 49 Their at-
tempts were criticized by politicians and members of the bar."' Re-
distribution has been characterized as theft.2 ' The work of Legal
Services organizations has been criticized as judicial engineering. 252
244. Crosby & Lubin, supra note 242, at 163.
245. Staub, supra note 230, at 56.
246. See id. (noting that the ongoing attempts in California and Texas to eliminate affirma-
tive action programs speaks to moral exclusion); see also Michelle Fine, "The Public" in Public
Schools: The Social Construction/Constriction of Moral Communities, 46 J. OF Soc. IssuEs 107
(1990) (discussing efforts by affluents in three communities to exclude poor children of color and
females from access to public education).
247. Staub, supra note 230, at 57 (noting that many varied world views and ideologies, in-
cluding both communism and capitalism, use exclusion to justify existing social arrangements).
248. See Antonio Ind. Sch. Bd. v. Texas, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that class was not a
suspect category. The decision was rendered despite the overwhelming evidence that poor peo-
ple are legally disadvantaged because they are poor).
249. See Bellow, supra note 162 (describing the. desire to help create a new vision of the
world as the motivation behind "political lawyering"); Martha Minow, Political Lawyering: An
Introduction, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 287 (1996).
250. See, e.g., Spiro Agnew, What's Wrong with the Legal Services Program, 58 A.B.A. J. 930,
931 (1972); Marshall Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60 N.C. L. REv. 282
(1982).
251. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMi-
NENT DOMAIN (1985) (arguing that taxing the wealthy to provide for the poor was taking with-
out compensation); see also Christine P. Blado, Pro Bono - Pro and Con, 77 A.B.A. J. 10 (1991).
252. See Ronald H. Silverman, Conceiving a Lawyer's Duty to the Poor, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV.
885, 1066-67, nn.378, 380 (1990-91) (stating that even "liberal" lawyers may be skeptical about
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Further, legal professional and academicians have questioned whether
redistributive goals discourage the poor from seeking and engaging in
productive work. 25 3 Legal economists have also derided the concept
of redistribution of wealth.254
In addition, some core values that are central to American legal
identity hamper our ability to reach some resolution on the issue of
poor clients. The most obstructive is the valuing of individual rights
over all others.255 The spirit of individualism protects the right of the
individual against the rights of society as a whole. The weight of our
system favors protecting individuals unless the state can establish a
basis for imposing upon their rights.256
Liberty entitles us to do what we want, when we want to do it.
American whites consistently rank the value of freedom highly, as it
reflects the liberty interest. And, it has been demonstrated that the
value orientation of individualism can adversely affect attitudes to the
poor. Equality refers to the value of being treated fairly and the same
as others. There is debate over whether our system really values
equality or whether it would be more correct to say equity, where eq-
uity means that a person gets what they deserve. 257
The problems of the clients living in poverty are complex and
firmly entrenched in economic, political and moral struggles that have
been going on for a long time. Solutions to these problems will not be
easily found. It is always much easier to document the misery as op-
redistribution); Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettelson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity
and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 337, 380 (1978).
253. See Silverman, supra note 252, at 1066 n.379 (citing CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING
GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980 (1984). The argument that redistribution
reduces the incentive to work defies study results, which show most of the poor want to work. In
other contexts, similar arguments would be ludicrous. If a municipality gives a corporation a tax
cut to lure its business, does that give the corporation less incentive to come in and do well? It
also vividly highlights the connection between law and social values of the majority).
254. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 442-43 (3d ed. 1986); Richard
A. Epstein, No New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 747 (1990). But see Mark M. Hager, The
Emperor's Clothes Are Not Efficient: Posner's Jurisprudence of Class, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 7 (1991)
(critiquing Posner for allowing the concept of the worthiness of the poor to creep into his eco-
nomic analysis).
255. See Robert D. Cooter, The Best Right Laws: Value Foundations of Economic Analysis,
64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817 (1989).
256. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Priority Paradigm: Private Choices and the Limits of
Equality, 57 U. Prri. L. REV. 363 (1996) (noting that the inherent assumption of liberalism is
that individual autonomy is privileged over social justice).
257. See id. (noting that the objections to affirmative action types of remedies for people of
color is that they interfere with the autonomy of individual whites. There is no expectation that
individual rights will be weighed in order to achieve remedying of societal ills. In addition, the
dominant belief that individual hard work alone produces rewards works against dominant ac-
ceptance of affirmative action policies).
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posed to fixing it. After all, as a profession, we know that discrimina-
tion against black and Latino clients exists, as was confirmed most
recently by studies of racism in the federal court system. 258 We know
that poor people routinely stay in jail longer than clients who have
private counsel because they cannot afford to post bail.259 We know
that despite procedural advances made on behalf of welfare recipients
and tenants in the 1960's and early 1970's that poor people are still
living in substandard housing where landlords fail to make timely or
adequate repairs. And, finally we know that some of the lawyers who
choose to represent the poor have not always had the best interests of
their clients at heart. 260 There is nothing new about any of the things
mentioned above. Yet, for the most part, lawyers seemed resigned to
accept the seemingly hopeless morass of "poverty law" and the dreari-
ness of our client's lives. For all the talk of empowering our clients,261
we seemed to have settled for business as usual.
VI. A POSSIBLE AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
One of the ways we can help law students and lawyers who re-
present the poor transform their thinking about poor people is to help
legal professionals become more aware of the way they actually relate
to poverty. The first step in correcting any problem is to become
aware of the problem. And if, in fact, we can demonstrate that stu-
dents, lawyers in general, and poverty lawyers specifically, do hold be-
liefs that push them to devalue the client, then we can begin to do
something about it.262 There is room within the literature for scholars
258. See Benjamin Weisser, Study of U.S. Courts Finds Race and Sex Bias Common, N.Y.
TIMES, Jun. 11, 1997, at B6 (stating that the special task force found bias in the Second Circuit);
Courts Called Fair to Women but Wanting in Racial and Ethnic Diversity, N.J. L.J., May 26, 1997
(reviewing findings of the Third Circuit task force).
259. See Uphoff, supra note 191, at 86 n.47 (noting that "studies demonstrate that bail prac-
tices exert considerable pressure on criminal defendants to enter guilty pleas, especially if the
defendant's ability to make bail is coupled with a delay in appointment of counsel").
260. See Cahn, Power, supra note 160, at 1042; see also Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions into
Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NAT'L LEGAL AID DEFENDERS Ass'N BRIEFCASE 106,
108 (1977).
261. See, e.g., Linda S. Durston & Linda G. Mills, Toward a New Dynamic in Poverty Client
Empowerment: The Rhetoric, Politics and Therapeutics of Opening Statements in Social Security
Disability Hearings, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119 (1996); Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for
Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399 (1996); Andrew Gold-
farb, Client Autonomy and Clinic Guidance, 3 GEo. J. ON FIorINo POVERTY 97 (1995); Joel F.
Handler, Community Care for the Frail Elderly: A Theory of Empowerment, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 541
(1989).
262. See Jacobs, Legal, supra note 3, at 105-07 (discussing the possibility of changing value
and value driven behavior); Fran Quigley, Seizing the Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the
Teaching of Social Justice in Law School, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 37 (1995) (using the clinical experi-
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who reject the premise of hopelessness and shrug off business as
usual. In order to begin the job, those who are the self-designated
(either in reality or in theory) representatives of the poor must begin
by examining our own behavior and motivation for doing the work we
do. No one enjoys being critiqued. As clinicians, we know this from
watching our students' resistance to our critiques of their work. How-
ever, constructive criticism can only be good. In this regard, I believe
clinicians and legal service providers are sometimes hypersensitive to
criticism. The hypersensitivity is quite understandable given the full
assault which Legal Services providers have had to endure from politi-
cal forces over the past twelve to sixteen years, 263 the critique of ex-
Legal Services lawyers,26 4 and the continued resistance in many law
schools towards the establishment of skills-relevant course work. By
failing to permit criticism, however, clinicians and legal service provid-
ers fall into the trap that liberals find themselves in on the "race is-
sues." Serious criticism of liberal positions on matters of race are
suppressed because liberals do not want to face the racism that is in-
herent in their own activities.265 Our clients cannot afford for us to
engage in such delusions. I have argued in other places that we need
to do more holistic lawyering on behalf of the poor.26 6 But first, we
must begin to understand why we, as lawyers who work on behalf of
the poor, think the way we do about our clients. We must evaluate
ence of exposure to client's life as a way of helping law students expand understanding of
others): Joel W. Grube et al., Inducing Change in Values, Attitudes and Behaviors: Belief System
Theory and the Method of Value Self-Confrontation, 50 J. OF Soc. ISSUES 153, 153-71 (1994); see
also Stuart W. Cook, Toward a Psychology of Improving Justice: Research on Extending the
Equality Principle to Victims of Social Injustice, 46 J. OF Soc. ISSUES 147 (1990) (exposing people
to the outgroup research that looks into encouraging the expansion of moral communities). But
see Crosby & Lubin, supra note 242 (asserting that though expanding moral community is good,
it is also difficult and entails certain risks such as producing uncertainty and insecurity; at some
point a decision to close the community must still be made).
263. See generally William F. Harvey, LSC - The Greatest Fraud Ever?, in LEGAL SERVICES
FOR THE POOR: TIME FOR REFORM 81 (1990) (explaining that Harvey was a former LSC board
chairman appointed by then president Ronald Reagan. His critique of Legal Services was used
as a justification for Republican attempts to eliminate funding). See Buchanan, supra note 164,
at 1016 n.60 (discussing the decline in funding for Legal Services which occurred during the
Nixon. Reagan, and Bush administrations).
264. See Feldman, supra note 191.
265. Liberals are frequently offended when people of color disagree or challenge them on
their positions on race issues. The recent O.J. Simpson trial as well as the perpetual debate over
whether Minister Louis Farrakhan of the Nation of Islam is worthy of support are just two exam-
ples of this tension. For a critique of the treatment of Minister Farrakhan and recognition of his
First Amendment rights, see Jeanne M. Woods, Travel That Talks: Toward First Amendment
Protection for Freedom of Movement, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 106 (1997) (noting that white
liberals have convinced themselves that they do not harbor racism; when they are then accused
of racist behavior, they experience dissonance).
266. See Jacobs, Legal, supra note 3, at 110-11.
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whether our value driven behavior inhibits our ability to help place
the client in a materially better legal position when they leave us than
before the client encountered us.
The pilot study raised enough interesting questions that it ap-
pears worthwhile to repeat it on a larger scale with both law students
and lawyers. Several obstacles need to be resolved to successfully ac-
complish a further study. The students in the pilot study completed
the surveys during the clinical instruction hour. Many clinicians were
reluctant to give up an hour of class time. One possible solution
would be to allow the subjects to complete the study after class or at
some time that was convenient for the students. Alternatively, it may
be possible to establish a web site where students could complete the
study at any time. 67 Procurement of grant funding would assist in
providing compensation to the individuals required to administer the
study and perhaps to the subjects as well.2 68
Potential items to include in a scenario would be fact patterns
involving clients that are late for appointments or who miss them alto-
gether. Inquiries can be made about the responsibilities of those pro-
viding representation when the client does not seem to care about her
predicament. Client behavior can be contrasted against how thor-
oughly the lawyer prepared for meeting the client or for the court
appearance in question. These issues trouble clinical students, partic-
ularly if the students believe the client behavior demonstrates irre-
sponsibility. Many students, including those who identify themselves
as liberal, can be severely judgmental towards the client when they
think the client is not "helping" to better her situation. It would be
intriguing to attempt an inquiry, which would allow the student to de-
fine zealousness or at least components of it.
There is a developing body of research that indicates when re-
sources are scarce, both liberals and conservatives make resource allo-
cations on the basis of worthiness.2 69 The clinical application is
267. The web alternative is intriguing but presents problems of confidentiality. In addition,
students completing the study on the web would need to agree not to discuss the study with any
student who had not yet completed it.
268. Payment, even if small, may encourage a higher rate of completion. However, there is
disagreement in the psychology community as to whether subjects should be paid.
269. See Linda Skitka & Philip E. Tetlock, Allocating Scarce Resources: A Contingency
Model of Distributive Justice, 28 J. oF EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 491-522 (1992). In the
study, subjects were asked to allocate resources such as AZT treatment for AIDS victims when
resources were scarce. Both liberals and conservatives considered the cause of the recipient's
illness in making allocation decisions. If the recipient was perceived as causing his own illness,
he was denied assistance. Id. at 519. However, when there was no scarcity of resources, liberals
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readily apparent. Clinics can only serve a few clients each semester.
All clinical students are aware of restricted intake process at their own
institutions. In addition, the students enrolled in clinic have other
classes and personal responsibilities that compete for their time.
They, like other poverty lawyers, view their time as their scarcest re-
source.27 1 Creating hypotheticals of this nature could help produce a
clearer set of data to use in evaluating whether student value ranking
can predict evaluations of zealous representation.2
71
More data on law students would certainly be instructive for clini-
cians in helping us to develop course material that will guide the stu-
dents toward a better appreciation of the worth and value of their
clients.
Lawyers who practice in the poverty area could benefit as well.
In this regard, a study of poverty lawyers would produce valuable in-
sight for the lawyers into the realities of their own perception about
their client population. Many Legal Services, Legal Aid and public
defender offices have thousands of suitable subjects. 272 In addition, a
conversation can be initiated within the bar itself about zealousness,
particularly with regard to the representation of poor people. Should
we attempt to define "zealousness" more precisely? It seems that
would be difficult to do. Further, we run the risk that in an effort to
become more concrete, the bar would actually create standards that
do, in fact, reflect minimally competent behavior. Finally, the adop-
allocated resources without regard to cause. Conservatives continued to consider the recipient's
self-exposure. Id. at 517; see also Linda J. Skitka & Philip E. Tetlock, Providing Public Assis-
tance: Cognitive and Motivational Processes Underlying Liberal and Conservative Policy Prefer-
ence, 65 J. of PERSONALITY & SoC. PSYCHOL. 1205-23 (1993). The authors conducted a series of
three studies where participants were asked to make resource allocations. The recipients' moral
characteristics were manipulated to test whether liberals and conservatives would respond to
recipient worthiness. In this series of studies, both conservatives and liberals were asked to
make allocation decisions based on whether the recipient had taken personal responsibility for
his behavior and reformed. The findings indicated that the generosity of liberals was strained
when confronted with an irresponsible claimant. Id. at 1220. Conservatives, on the other hand
were more willing to assist those who had taken responsibility and reformed themselves. Id.
270. See supra note 9 (noting that the allocation of scarce resources of both clinical space and
student time may have played a role in the reaction the students had to the client "missing" his
appointment).
271. In the larger undergraduate study conducted by Dr. Brown, the thoroughness of a tu-
tor's preparation for the tutoring session (contrasted with a student's preparation) was evalu-
ated. In the scenarios where the students being tutored failed to prepare for the session
seriously, or where the subjects perceived the student to be less serious, the subjects were less
willing to criticize the tutor's own lack of preparation. See Brown, supra note 93.
272. See, e.g., Daniel L. Greenberg, A Modest Proposal to Clinicians from the Legal Aid
Society, 3 CLINICAL L. REv. 249 (1996) (noting that Greenberg, a former clininician, offered the
approximately one thousand lawyers on his staff a research lab for those clinicians interested in
developing scholarship on lawyers and the practice of law).
[VOL. 44:257
Full Legal Representation
tion of standards may lead to the imposition of penalties for failure to
meet those standards. I would not want to see the adoption of penal-
ties as it would chill lawyers' willingness to handle indigent work.
A different approach might entail establishing "competencies"
for fields of practice as has been done in psychology and sociology. In
those fields practitioners are urged to develop competencies to help
ensure they are qualified to counsel in particular fields.
Another potential group for study would be the graduates of An-
tioch Law School, the D.C. School of Law and CUNY Law School.
These three law schools were founded with the intention of changing
the face of legal education and the faces of those practicing law. All
three hoped to produce graduates who were committed to working on
behalf of the dispossessed.2 73 Comparisons of value priorities be-
tween those graduates and other traditionally trained lawyers may
yield clues about whether values are consistent across the
profession.2 74
An exploration of lawyer motivation may help to prevent the
subsistence method of lawyering.275 If lawyers believed that their cli-
ents were worthy of a more creative approach to legal problem solv-
ing, perhaps creative solutions would be generated on a larger scale
and with less resistance from lawyers.2 76 Recent efforts to try creative
new approaches have been successful, but they are still few and far
between.27 7 Many of the new approaches to attacking issues of pov-
erty could have great application across clinical fields and have the
opportunity to provide far better and quicker solutions to real
273. See Thomasine M. Williams, District of Columbia School of Law: A Tradition of Advo-
cacy, 8-Oct,. NAT'L B.A. MAO. 22 (1994) (tracing the D.C. School of Law's tradition to Edgar
and Jean Cahn's founding of the Antioch College of Law); Edgar Cahn, Remarks by Edgar Cahn
Accepting the 1997 Section on Clinical Legal Education Award, 3 CLINICAL L. REV. 253 (1997).
274. My thanks to Professor Mary Zulack for the suggestion of such a study.
275. See Cahn, Power, supra note 160.
276. See Southworth, supra note 89 (noting that lawyer resistance to change is most notewor-
thy in the Legal Services arena where many programs have failed to create realistic and substan-
tive opportunities for community input on the issue of allocation of resources and case matter
prioritizing); See Houseman, supra note 122, at 186; see also Lee & Lee, supra note 184; Chris-
tine Zuni Cruz, [On The] Road Back In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous Communities, 24
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 229 (2000) (describing the ways in which culture and knowledge impact on
rendering legal service to a community).
277. See Susan R. Jones, Small Business and Community Economic Development: Transac-
tional Lawyering for Social Change and Economic Justice, 4 CLINICAL L. REv. 195 (1997); Louise
G. Trubeck, The Worst of Times And the Best of Times: Lawyering for Poor Clients Today, 22
FORDHAM URn. L.J. 1123 (1995); Cahn, Reinventing, supra note 183, at 2133 (describing the use
of time dollars to benefit the client and the client's community); see also Matthew Diller, Lawy-
ering for Poor Communities in the Twenty-First Century, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 673 (1998).
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problems than governmentally-regulated legal services could ever
hope to accomplish."' Yet, in order to visualize such solutions, law-
yers have to believe that there is something untenable about repre-
senting a client multiple times for a simple, fixable offense. The
lawyer would have to believe that the client, as a human being, de-
serves to have every possibility explored to put her in a better space.
The lawyer would need to believe that the client has value and is wor-
thy of having full representation.
278. For example, in the criminal context I am intrigued with the concept of time dollars, not
necessarily as payment for lawyer services as Cahn suggests, but as an alternative to multiple
misdemeanor or municipal criminal violations which are essentially financially driven. Take a
defendant who is given a ticket for reckless driving. The sentence imposed is completion of a
safe driver course and the payment of a fine of $100. The defendant completes the course,
remains out of trouble, but does not keep to the fine schedule. Administratively, his driver's
license is revoked for failure to pay the fine. Defendant continues to drive back and forth to
work and is eventually charged with driving while his license is suspended. More fines are added
on, which the client cannot pay, and he receives additional probation, etc. It would be interest-
ing to see if a program could be developed with a church or other community based organization
where defendant can have initial fine paid in return for time dollars. Defendant comes through
the legal system once, as opposed to multiple times.
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